Qilin Ransomware: Fact Sheet and the Credential Harvest
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Qilin Ransomware

Qilin, also known as Agenda, is a ransomware-as-a-service operation. Its operators provide the ransomware and infrastructure, and affiliates carry out the attacks, stealing data and encrypting systems.

A threat profile published by the US Department of Health and Human Services in June 2024 describes the group, and the group has remained active since. This page gives the facts in brief, then looks closely at the technique that sets Qilin intrusions apart: harvesting saved passwords from every machine in a domain.

Qilin Fact Sheet

Also known asAgenda
First seenMid-2022 as Agenda, using the name Qilin by September 2022
ModelRansomware as a service, with affiliates keeping 80 to 85 percent of each payment
ExtortionDouble extortion, with a data leak site
TargetingAssessed as opportunistic. Organizations in many countries and industries, including education, healthcare, and other critical services.
RansomwareFirst written in Go, later rewritten in Rust
Systems encryptedWindows, and VMware ESXi through a Linux version identified in December 2023
Entry routes reportedPhishing, exposed remote services such as remote desktop, and VPN accounts without multi-factor authentication
Tools reportedRemote monitoring and management tools, penetration testing frameworks, remote execution over file sharing and SSH, and vulnerable drivers used to disable security software

Because affiliates choose their own methods, no two Qilin intrusions are identical. The entry route in particular varies with whoever is carrying out the attack.

The Linux version encrypts virtual machines at the hypervisor, where security software inside the guests does not see it. What to watch and protect there is covered in our Akira profile.

How the Qilin Service Works

The affiliate model common to most ransomware is described in our guide to ransomware attack stages, detection and response. The US health department’s threat profile adds details specific to Qilin.

The operators recruit affiliates on criminal forums, and the profile records recruiting activity in late 2023. The share affiliates keep is at the upper end for such services, which is how an operation attracts skilled intruders.

Affiliates are given a builder that lets them tailor the ransomware to each victim. The threat profile describes options such as which file extensions to add, which processes and services to stop, and which folders to skip. A tailored build is harder to recognize from one victim to the next.

The move from the Go language to Rust belongs to the same effort. Rust programs are efficient, can be compiled for Windows and Linux from one code base, and are more awkward for analysts to take apart. For defenders it means relying less on recognizing the file and more on recognizing what an intruder does before running it.

Qilin and Healthcare

The main government source on Qilin was written by the health sector’s cybersecurity center in the United States. Its profile records at least fifteen incidents involving this ransomware in the healthcare sector worldwide between October 2022 and mid-2024, and it lists education and other critical services alongside healthcare.

Affiliates do not appear to select healthcare on principle. Health services are exposed for reasons that suit any affiliate: downtime affects patient care at once, medical records strengthen the leak threat, and clinicians, contractors, and suppliers all connect from outside.

In June 2024, an attack attributed to Qilin on Synnovis, a pathology provider for London hospitals, disrupted blood testing and forced appointments and operations to be postponed.

In Australia, the Australian Signals Directorate reports that ransomware incidents against the healthcare sector doubled in 2024-25 compared with the year before.

The Credential Harvest

One technique reported in a Qilin intrusion deserves close attention, because it changes what recovery involves.

A US health sector bulletin from August 2024 reports that Qilin operators were stealing credentials stored in the Chrome browser. The intrusion it describes began with compromised credentials for a VPN that had no multi-factor authentication. Attackers who had reached a domain controller then used Group Policy to run a script at logon on machines across the domain. The script collected the credentials saved in each user’s browser and gathered them for the attackers.

The method is simple and uses the domain’s own management system. Group Policy is designed to run settings and scripts on every joined computer. An attacker with domain administrator rights can add a logon script as easily as an administrator can. As each person signs in, their machine runs it.

A policy linked at the top of the domain applies to every computer in it. Machines pick up policy changes in the background, by default about every 90 minutes, and a logon script then runs at each user’s next sign-in. One change made on one domain controller reaches the whole organization as staff sign in, with no further action by the attacker.

Why a Logon Script Is Enough

Browsers encrypt saved passwords with a key that Windows ties to the user’s own sign-in. That protects the password file if it is copied to another machine. It does nothing against a program that runs as the user, inside the user’s session, because Windows releases the key to it as it would to the browser. A logon script runs in exactly that position, so it needs no exploit and no administrator rights on the workstation.

Browser sync widens the reach. Where a member of staff has signed in to the browser with a personal account, passwords saved on a home computer are present on the work machine as well and are collected with the rest.

Why It Matters

Ordinary ransomware response treats directory passwords as compromised and resets them. A browser credential harvest reaches much further.

Every saved login is exposed

Passwords for cloud applications, banking portals, supplier systems, and government services that staff saved in their browsers.

Third-party accounts are included

Systems the organization does not run and cannot reset centrally.

Personal accounts are included

Anything a member of staff saved on a work machine.

The exposure outlasts the incident

Restoring every server does nothing about a password for a supplier portal that is now in criminal hands.

The work this creates is set out under Recovery After a Credential Harvest below.

Detecting the Harvest

The stages before the harvest, from entry to control of the domain, follow the usual course of a ransomware intrusion. The harvest itself adds a step that is recorded in several places.

Group Policy changes

A new or modified policy that adds a logon script is recorded by domain controllers as a directory change (event 5136, where directory change auditing is on). One made outside working hours, by an account that does not normally manage policy, is a high-priority alert.

New files in the domain’s shared policy folder

Logon scripts are stored in the SYSVOL share, which every domain controller replicates and every machine can read. A new script file there has no innocent explanation outside a planned change.

The same script running everywhere

Endpoint telemetry shows an identical script starting at logon on many machines within a short period. Seen on one machine it might be missed. Seen on fifty in a morning it is unmistakable.

Access to browser credential stores

A script or unfamiliar process reads the files where browsers keep saved logins.

Output collected centrally

Files are written from many machines to one share.

The harvest also takes time. The script has to wait for people to sign in, which can mean days. That delay is unusual in a ransomware intrusion, and it is an opportunity. An organization that notices the policy change has a real chance of acting before any encryption happens.

Reducing the Exposure

Stop browsers saving passwords on work devices

Chrome and Edge both accept a centrally managed policy that switches the built-in password manager off, so the setting does not depend on each user.

Clear what is already saved

Switching the feature off does not remove passwords stored earlier, so plan a cleanup alongside the move to a managed password manager.

Block personal browser profiles on work machines

This keeps passwords saved at home from being synchronized onto a domain computer.

Restrict who can change Group Policy

Review which accounts and groups hold edit rights on each policy object as well as who is a domain administrator, and alert on every change.

Protect domain administrator accounts

Use dedicated administration devices and strong authentication, since the technique depends on that level of access.

Put multi-factor authentication on outside services

A harvested password is worth far less against a supplier or banking portal that also asks for a second factor.

Questions to Ask Your IT Team or Provider

The reported Qilin intrusions depended on a small number of conditions. A manager who is not technical can check for them by asking direct questions and expecting specific answers.

Does every account that can use the VPN have multi-factor authentication?

Ask for the list of exceptions. Vendor accounts, service accounts, and accounts for former staff are the usual gaps.

Would we be told if someone changed Group Policy at night?

The answer should name the alert and who receives it.

Who are the domain administrators, and where do they sign in from?

The right answers are a short list and dedicated administration devices.

Who else can edit Group Policy?

Edit rights are often delegated to groups nobody has reviewed for years.

Are staff allowed to save work passwords in their browsers?

If yes, ask what the alternative would be and what it would take to switch.

Could someone reach the virtualization management console from an ordinary office computer?

It should be reachable only from an administration network.

Where are the VPN, firewall, and domain controller logs kept, and for how long?

The answer should be central storage and at least 90 days.

Who watches for alerts outside office hours?

The answer should name a person or a service.

Vague answers are findings in themselves.

Recovery After a Credential Harvest

Where saved browser passwords were collected across the domain, the recovery has a second track that runs alongside restoring systems. It is mostly communication and coordination, and it is a far larger task than a directory reset.

1
Establish who was affectedIdentify every user who signed in while the malicious policy was active. Endpoint and logon records give the list.
2
Tell them plainlyExplain that passwords saved in their browser on a work computer should be treated as stolen. This includes personal accounts they saved there or synchronized from another device.
3
Prioritize by damageAsk finance staff to change banking and payment portal passwords first, then administrators for any third-party consoles, then everyone else.
4
Reset what the organization controlsDirectory passwords are reset centrally. For cloud applications behind single sign-on, revoke sessions as well.
5
Deal with shared and service loginsTeam accounts for supplier portals, social media, and government services are often saved in several browsers. Change each and record who now holds it.
6
Warn third partiesWhere credentials for a supplier’s or customer’s system were exposed, tell that organization so it can watch for misuse.
7
Watch for useMonitor sign-ins to the organization’s own systems for attempts with old passwords, and ask staff to report unexpected alerts from outside services.
8
Clear the storesRemove saved passwords from browsers on rebuilt machines, and move staff to a managed password manager before they start saving again.
9
Consider notificationStolen credentials may give access to personal information held in other systems. Include this in the data breach assessment.
10
Keep the script and its outputThe script shows which browsers and files it read, and any collected output shows whose passwords were taken, which turns an assumption into a list.

This work can continue for weeks after servers are back. Assigning one person to own it prevents it being lost in the larger recovery.

If Qilin Has Hit Your Organization

General ransomware first response applies here as it does to any group, and our guide to ransomware attack stages, detection and response covers it. With Qilin, do these before anything is reconnected.

Clean Group Policy first. Remove unauthorized scripts and scheduled tasks before any machine rejoins the domain. If the policy is still in place, the script runs again at the next logon and harvests the new passwords. Check every domain controller, because the policy folder is replicated between them, and a domain controller restored from a backup taken during the intrusion brings the script back.

Start the password track on day one. Treat every password saved in a browser on a domain computer as stolen, and begin the work described in the section above while systems are still down.

Preserve hypervisor logs. Qilin affiliates encrypt virtual machines from the host, so the management interface holds the record of when and from which account that happened.

Government agencies advise against paying a ransom. Australian organizations can report an incident to the Australian Signals Directorate through cyber.gov.au.

Qilin Ransomware Response With ThreatDefence

ThreatDefence monitors domain controllers, endpoints, and network traffic 24x7 for the activity that precedes a Qilin deployment: credential theft, security tools being disabled, and software pushed to many machines at once. Our SOC isolates hosts and disables accounts under agreed authority.

After an attack that included a credential harvest, our responders help scope which accounts and third-party sites were exposed, and our SOC monitors sign-ins while passwords are reset.

Response actions in the ThreatDefence portal: revoke sessions, reset password, isolate endpoint and block address, each with its operating mode, status and rollback

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    Frequently Asked Questions

    What is Qilin ransomware?

    Qilin is a ransomware-as-a-service operation, first seen in mid-2022 under the name Agenda. Affiliates use it to steal data and encrypt Windows systems and VMware ESXi virtual machines, then demand payment under threat of publishing the data.

    Is Qilin the same as Agenda ransomware?

    Yes. The ransomware appeared as Agenda in mid-2022 and was using the name Qilin by September of that year. Some reports still use Agenda for the malware and Qilin for the service, which is why both names turn up in advisories and in security tool alerts. An alert for either name is the same threat.

    How does Qilin ransomware get in?

    Government reporting describes phishing, exposed remote services such as remote desktop, and VPN accounts without multi-factor authentication. The intrusion that ended in the browser password harvest started with the last of these. An account with no second factor is the condition to remove first, because using it takes no exploit and no mistake by a member of staff.

    Does Qilin ransomware steal passwords?

    Yes. In an intrusion described by US health authorities in August 2024, attackers used Group Policy to run a logon script that collected passwords saved in Chrome on machines across the domain. Every password saved in a browser on those machines has to be changed, including passwords for outside services the organization cannot reset itself.

    Does Qilin target VMware ESXi?

    Yes. A Linux version that encrypts virtual machines on VMware ESXi hosts was identified in December 2023. Every guest on an affected host stops together, and recovery starts with rebuilding the host. Hypervisor management logs, sent to storage off the host, are the record of when the encryption ran and which account started it.

    Which industries does Qilin target?

    The US Department of Health and Human Services assesses Qilin’s targeting as opportunistic. Organizations in education, healthcare, and other critical services have been affected across many countries. Affiliates pick victims by the access they can obtain, so an exposed remote access route matters more than the industry an organization belongs to.

    Should we pay a Qilin ransom?

    Government agencies advise against paying, because payment does not guarantee file recovery or deletion of stolen data. With Qilin there is a further point. Passwords harvested from browsers stay usable whatever is paid, so the reset work is needed either way. The decision belongs to executives, supported by legal counsel and the insurer.