Akira Ransomware: The Assets It Targets and How to Respond
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Akira Ransomware

Akira is a ransomware group that has been active since March 2023. It steals data and encrypts systems, then threatens to publish the data if the victim does not pay. A joint advisory from the FBI, CISA, and partner agencies, last updated in November 2025, documents the group’s methods.

Akira’s intrusions run through a predictable set of assets: the VPN, the backup server, the domain controller, and the hypervisor. This profile takes each asset in turn.

Akira at a Glance

Active sinceMarch 2023
ModelDouble extortion: data theft, then encryption, with a leak site on the Tor network
VictimsMainly small and medium-sized businesses, with larger organizations also affected
Sectors namedEducation, critical manufacturing, information technology, healthcare, financial services, food and agriculture
RegionsNorth America, Europe, and Australia
ProceedsApproximately USD 244 million as of late September 2025, according to the FBI and CISA
Systems encryptedWindows, and virtual machines on VMware ESXi, Hyper-V, and Nutanix AHV
File extensions.akira, .powerranges, .akiranew, .aki
Ransom notefn.txt or akira_readme.txt
SpeedIn some incidents, data was exfiltrated just over two hours after initial access

Akira leaves no demand in the note. The victim is told to contact the group through a site on the Tor network using a unique code. The FBI also reports cases where the group phoned the victim company.

Where Akira Came From

The joint advisory notes that Akira may be connected to the Conti ransomware group, which ceased operating in 2022. It also records that security researchers track the activity under several other names, including Storm-1567, Howling Scorpius, Punk Spider, and Gold Sahara. The advisory was written by the FBI and CISA with Europol and agencies in France, Germany, and the Netherlands.

The group’s tooling has changed several times, which the advisory documents:

March 2023

The first version, written in C++, encrypts Windows systems and adds the .akira extension.

April 2023

A Linux variant appears, built to encrypt virtual machines on VMware ESXi.

August 2023

A new Windows encryptor written in Rust, called Megazord, adds the .powerranges extension. The advisory assesses it as likely out of use since 2024.

Later versions

A Rust-based encryptor the advisory calls Akira_v2 targets both ESXi and Windows, with more control over what is encrypted.

June 2025

The group encrypts virtual machine disk files on Nutanix AHV for the first time observed.

Akira moved to virtualization platforms within a month of first appearing, which shows where it sees the leverage. It has also kept building new encryptors, which takes a standing development effort.

The victim profile fits the way in. Smaller organizations are more likely to run a VPN without multi-factor authentication, less likely to have 24x7 monitoring, and often have a single IT generalist managing everything.

An Akira Intrusion, Start to Finish

Putting the advisory’s findings in order gives the usual course of an intrusion. The sections that follow take each asset in turn, and the stages common to all ransomware are in our guide to ransomware attack stages, detection and response.

1
EntryThe operator comes in through the VPN, an exposed remote desktop service, or a vulnerable backup server.
2
FootholdNew accounts and a remote access tool let the operator return without the VPN.
3
CredentialsPasswords are taken from memory, from Kerberos service tickets, and from the backup server.
4
MappingScanners and directory queries list servers, shares, and administrators.
5
MovementThe operator reaches file servers, the backup server, domain controllers, and hypervisor management.
6
TheftData is archived and uploaded.
7
Clearing defensesSecurity software is stopped and restore points are removed.
8
EncryptionWindows systems and virtual machines are encrypted.
9
ExtortionThe victim finds the note and has to make contact to learn the demand.

The speed recorded in the advisory covers steps one to six, which is fast enough to happen within one night.

The VPN

The VPN is where most Akira intrusions begin. The advisory’s most consistent finding is VPN services without multi-factor authentication, entered with stolen or guessed credentials.

Akira also exploits the devices themselves. The advisory names SonicWall devices through CVE-2024-40766, and Cisco vulnerabilities including CVE-2020-3259 and CVE-2023-20269. On SonicWall devices the operators either stole credentials or exploited the flaw to obtain VPN access. Brute-force attempts against VPN endpoints and password spraying with a tool called SharpDomainSpray are listed as well.

What to watch

VPN logons from countries, networks, or device names an account has never used. Any successful logon by an account without a second factor. Bursts of failed logons across many accounts. New local accounts or configuration changes on the appliance.

How to protect it

Multi-factor authentication on every VPN account, with no exceptions for service or vendor accounts. Patch the appliance as soon as fixes are released. Send its logs to central storage, since they are the record of how the attacker arrived.

The Backup Server

Akira treats backup infrastructure as both a way in and a store of credentials. The advisory names unpatched Veeam Backup and Replication servers, through CVE-2023-27532 and CVE-2024-40711, as an access route. In some incidents the operators first reached the network over SSH through a router’s address and then exploited the backup server.

Once on a backup server, the group uses tools that extract the credentials the backup software holds for every system it protects. This gives administrator access across the environment in one step, and lets the attacker remove restore points before encrypting.

What to watch

Interactive logons to backup servers outside backup windows. New processes or scripts running on them. Queries against the backup configuration database. Deleted jobs, shortened retention, or removed restore points in the backup console’s audit log.

How to protect it

Patch backup software promptly. Keep the backup server off the domain where possible, with its own credentials. Restrict which systems can reach it. Keep an offline or immutable copy that the backup administrator cannot delete.

The Domain Controller

Akira needs domain-level control to deploy widely, and the advisory describes several routes to it: dumping credentials from memory, Kerberoasting, and extracting the directory database. In some incidents the group powered down a domain controller’s virtual machine, copied its disk files, and attached them to a new virtual machine. That let it read the directory database and the system registry hive offline and obtain a domain administrator account.

Before that, the operators map the domain with built-in Windows commands. The advisory lists the ones used to enumerate domain controllers, domain trusts, and the members of the domain and local administrator groups, and a built-in system library used to dump the memory of the logon process.

For persistence, Akira creates new domain accounts. The advisory notes an administrative account named itadm in some incidents, and local accounts added to administrator groups.

What to watch

New accounts added to privileged groups. Credential dumping alerts on any host. A domain controller virtual machine powered off unexpectedly. Bulk directory queries from a workstation.

How to protect it

Use dedicated administration devices and keep domain administrator credentials off ordinary servers and workstations. Enable advanced auditing on domain controllers. Review privileged group membership regularly, and after any incident.

The Hypervisor

Encrypting virtual machines from the hypervisor takes many servers down in one action, and endpoint protection inside the virtual machines never sees it.

The advisory lists CVE-2024-37085 among the vulnerabilities the group exploits. It is an authentication bypass in VMware ESXi that gives an attacker who already controls Active Directory full access to hosts that use the directory for user management. The advisory also records operators changing host firewall rules to open ports.

What to watch

Logons to hypervisor management from unusual sources or at unusual hours. SSH being enabled on hosts. Firewall rule changes on hosts. Virtual machines powered off in bulk outside a maintenance window.

How to protect it

Put hypervisor management on a separate administration network. Use credentials that are not shared with the Windows domain. Forward hypervisor logs to central storage, since the hosts themselves may be encrypted.

File Servers and Data

Before encrypting, Akira copies data out. The advisory describes archive tools that split the data into segments, then transfer over FTP, SFTP, and to cloud storage services including Mega.

Remote access tools installed for persistence give the operators a way to browse and select files by hand, and tunneling tools keep a route open.

What to watch

Archive tools running on file servers. Remote access or tunneling software that IT did not install. Large outbound transfers from servers, particularly overnight.

How to protect it

Restrict outbound connections from servers to the destinations they need, and block file transfer protocols the business does not use. Retain firewall and proxy logs for long enough to investigate.

Our guide to data exfiltration investigation covers how to establish what was taken.

Tools Akira Uses

The advisory lists the tools observed in Akira intrusions. Most are legitimate programs or freely available utilities, which is why their presence, in the wrong place, is the signal.

PurposeTools named in the advisoryWhy it matters for detection
Remote access and persistenceAnyDesk, LogMeIn, RustDesk, Level.ioLegitimate products, so reputation checks pass them.
Tunneling and command and controlNgrok, Cloudflare Tunnel, SystemBC, Cobalt StrikeOutbound tunnels from servers are rare in normal operation.
Credential theftMimikatz, LaZagne, and tools that extract credentials from backup softwareEndpoint security detects these reliably where an agent is installed on the host.
DiscoveryAdvanced IP Scanner, SoftPerfect network scanner, AdFindScanning and bulk directory queries from a workstation or member server.
Lateral movementRemote desktop, SSH, MobaXterm, remote execution toolsAdministrator sessions between systems that do not normally connect.
Disabling defensesPowerTool, and the POORTRY driver with its loader STONESTOP, which use vulnerable signed drivers to terminate security softwareNew driver loads on servers, and agents that stop reporting.
Collection and exfiltrationWinRAR, 7-Zip, FileZilla, WinSCP, RcloneArchive and transfer programs on file servers, followed by large uploads.

An approved-software list turns most of this table into detections. An organization that knows exactly which remote access, archive, and transfer tools belong on its servers can alert on everything else.

How the Encryptor Works

The advisory describes the encryption in some detail, and a few points are useful to defenders.

Akira uses a hybrid scheme. Files are encrypted with a fast stream cipher, ChaCha20, and the key for that is protected with an RSA public key whose private half only the attackers hold. This is the standard design for modern ransomware and means files cannot be recovered by analyzing the encryptor.

The encryptor can be told to encrypt only a percentage of each file. Partial encryption is much faster and leaves large files, such as databases and virtual disks, just as unusable. It is one reason an entire environment can be encrypted in a short window.

Operators can aim it at a specific path or network share, and can run many encryption processes in parallel. The later version adds options to target virtual machines only, and to stop running virtual machines before encrypting their disks.

On Windows, volume shadow copies are deleted before encryption, removing the built-in way to restore previous versions of files. The ransom note is written to the root of the system drive and to each user’s home folder.

Partial encryption matters for recovery. Some large files may be repairable by specialists, so encrypted data should be kept.

Detection Priorities for Akira

Each asset section above lists what to watch. The order to build those detections in follows from how Akira works.

1
The VPN comes firstIt is the entry route in most incidents, and a logon that does not fit the account is the earliest warning available.
2
The backup server comes nextAkira goes there for credentials before it moves widely, so interactive activity on it is both early and specific.
3
Hypervisor management followsEncryption there is invisible to endpoint agents, so the management logs are the only place it shows.
4
The last signals need an automatic responseA security agent that stops reporting, a new driver on a server, or shadow copy deletion means encryption is close, and each one justifies isolating the affected systems immediately.

If Akira Has Hit Your Organization

The first moves are the same as for any ransomware attack: isolate affected systems, protect the backups, and bring in incident responders, the insurer, and legal counsel. Our guide to ransomware attack stages, detection and response sets out that sequence. An Akira intrusion adds checks of its own, because of the assets the group works through.

The VPN

Treat every VPN account as suspect until its password is reset and multi-factor authentication is enforced. Restrict the VPN in the meantime.

The backup server

Assume the credentials stored in the backup software are in the attacker’s hands, and change them along with the service accounts it used.

The hypervisors

Review who signed in to the management interfaces, and preserve those logs before hosts are rebuilt.

New accounts

Search the directory and local administrator groups for accounts created during the intrusion. Akira operators create them to get back in.

The evidence window

Keep VPN, firewall, directory, backup, and endpoint records for the weeks before encryption. The first sign-in is usually much earlier than the day files were locked.

The agencies behind the advisory do not encourage paying a ransom. Payment does not guarantee that files will be recovered or that stolen data will be deleted. In Australia, incidents can be reported to the Australian Signals Directorate through cyber.gov.au.

Where a Smaller Organization Should Start

The advisory’s recommendations can feel long for a team of one or two. Taken in order of effect, a short list covers most of the risk.

1
Put multi-factor authentication on the VPN, for every accountThis closes the route named most often in the advisory.
2
Patch the firewall, the VPN appliance, and the backup serverThese are the products named in the advisory, so subscribe to the vendors’ security notices.
3
Make one backup copy that cannot be deleted from the networkTest a restore from it.
4
Remove remote desktop from the internetThe advisory lists exposed remote desktop among the group’s entry routes.
5
Lengthen passwords on remote access accountsThe advisory recommends at least 15 characters, which makes password spraying far less likely to succeed.
6
List the remote access tools you useRemove or block the rest.
7
Review who is in the administrator groupsDelete accounts nobody recognizes.
8
Send VPN and firewall logs to central storageKeep them for at least 90 days.
9
Arrange monitoring for nights and weekendsMost of this group’s activity happens when the office is empty.
10
Know who you will callWrite the incident response contact down before it is needed.

Items 1 to 3 address how Akira gets in and how it prevents recovery.

Akira Ransomware Response With ThreatDefence

ThreatDefence monitors the assets Akira works through. Our platform collects VPN and firewall logs, endpoint telemetry from servers and domain controllers, and network traffic records, and our 24x7 SOC investigates sign-ins without multi-factor authentication, credential dumping, and backup tampering as they occur.

When agencies update their Akira advisory, our threat hunters search retained data across monitored environments for the tools and behavior it lists. If Akira is already in your network, our responders work to find every foothold before systems are restored.

Response actions in the ThreatDefence portal: revoke sessions, reset password, isolate endpoint and block address, each with its operating mode, status and rollback

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    Frequently Asked Questions

    What is Akira ransomware?

    Akira is a ransomware group first seen in March 2023. It steals data, encrypts Windows systems and virtual machines, and demands payment for decryption and for withholding what it took. The FBI and CISA put its proceeds at about USD 244 million by late September 2025.

    How does Akira ransomware get into a network?

    Most often through a VPN account that has no multi-factor authentication, using stolen, sprayed, or purchased credentials. The advisory also lists exploitation of SonicWall, Cisco, VMware ESXi, and Veeam vulnerabilities, exposed remote desktop services, and spearphishing. Any one of these is enough, so closing the VPN gap without patching the backup server still leaves a way in.

    Which file extensions does Akira ransomware use?

    Encrypted files have carried the extensions .akira, .powerranges, .akiranew, and .aki, and ransom notes are named fn.txt or akira_readme.txt. The .powerranges extension belongs to the Megazord encryptor, which the advisory considers likely out of use. An extension shows which encryptor ran. It says nothing about how far the intrusion reached or what data was taken.

    Does Akira ransomware target virtual machines?

    Yes. Akira encrypts virtual machines from the host on VMware ESXi, Hyper-V, and Nutanix AHV, and its encryptor can stop running virtual machines first. Recovery then starts with the hosts, because no guest can be restored until the platform under it is rebuilt. Back up host configuration as well as the virtual machines, and keep that copy off the platform.

    Does Akira steal data before encrypting?

    Yes. Data is archived and uploaded before encryption, and the group threatens to publish it on its leak site. The fastest cases in the advisory took just over two hours from entry to exfiltration. A full restore from backup therefore does not end the incident, and the data breach assessment has to start alongside recovery.

    Is Akira ransomware active in Australia?

    Yes. The joint advisory lists Australia among the regions where Akira has affected organizations, alongside North America and Europe. An Australian business with annual turnover above AUD 3 million that pays a ransom must report the payment within 72 hours under the Cyber Security Act 2024, whichever group is involved.

    Is there a free decryptor for Akira ransomware?

    Only for the oldest version. A free decryptor for the first 2023 Windows version was published in mid-2023. The group then changed its encryption, and no public tool exists for current versions. Keep the encrypted files anyway, because partially encrypted databases and virtual disks can sometimes be repaired by specialists.