LockBit Ransomware: Timeline, Takedown and What Remains
Skip to content

LockBit Ransomware

LockBit is a ransomware-as-a-service operation. A core group develops the ransomware and runs the infrastructure, and affiliates use it to attack organizations in exchange for a share of the proceeds.

LockBit was among the most active ransomware operations in the world until an international law enforcement operation disrupted it in February 2024. The disruption damaged the operation without ending it. This profile follows its history in order, then sets out what remains a threat today.

The LockBit Timeline

DateEvent
September 2019A ransomware known as ABCD, the predecessor of LockBit, is first observed.
January 2020Ransomware under the LockBit name appears on Russian-language criminal forums.
June 2021LockBit 2.0 appears, with a built-in data theft tool called StealBit.
October 2021A Linux version adds the ability to encrypt VMware ESXi virtual machines.
March 2022LockBit 3.0, also called LockBit Black, is released.
September 2022The builder for LockBit 3.0 leaks. Criminals outside the affiliate program can now produce their own versions.
January 2023LockBit Green appears, incorporating source code from the Conti ransomware.
June 2023CISA, the FBI, the Australian Cyber Security Centre, and agencies in five other countries publish a joint advisory on LockBit.
February 20, 2024The UK National Crime Agency announces Operation Cronos, which takes control of LockBit’s infrastructure.
May 7, 2024The United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia sanction a Russian national identified as LockBit’s administrator and developer.
October 2024A further phase of Operation Cronos brings more arrests, and the same countries sanction a man identified as a LockBit affiliate.
December 2024The United States announces charges against a man arrested in Israel and accused of being a LockBit developer.
Late 2024 to 2026The group announces LockBit 4.0 and then LockBit 5.0, and its leak site resumes listing victims.

Inside the Operation

The affiliate model common to most ransomware is described in our guide to ransomware attack stages, detection and response. The 2023 joint advisory and the later law enforcement findings show what LockBit did with that model, and why it grew so large.

It marketed itself. The advisory describes publicity stunts, including paying people to get LockBit tattoos, public criticism of rival ransomware services, and a bounty of one million dollars offered to anyone who could identify the person behind its public persona. All of this was aimed at attracting affiliates.

It made the product easy. Affiliates received a management panel with a point-and-click interface, so that carrying out an attack needed less technical skill. The service handled the encryptor, the leak site, and the payment system.

It built its own tools. LockBit 2.0 introduced StealBit, a purpose-built program for copying data out of a victim’s network. From 2021 affiliates stole data before encrypting and threatened to publish it.

It let affiliates take the money first. According to the advisory, affiliates received ransom payments before passing a share to the core group. Most services worked the other way, and this single policy made LockBit attractive to experienced intruders.

It expanded its reach. Versions were released for Linux and VMware ESXi, and by April 2023 encryptors built for macOS had been seen.

It set rules, and broke them. The ransomware skipped machines configured for a list of excluded languages, a common feature of ransomware developed in Russian-speaking countries. The group also claimed to forbid attacks on certain targets. After an affiliate attacked a children’s hospital in December 2022, LockBit apologized publicly and said the affiliate had been expelled. The National Crime Agency later found that the affiliate had stayed in the program until the takedown.

Because many unconnected affiliates worked under the same name, their methods varied widely. There is no single LockBit technique to block.

The Scale of LockBit

The 2023 advisory was written jointly by agencies in seven countries, and several contributed their own figures.

CountryWhat the agencies reported
Australia18 percent of reported ransomware incidents between April 2022 and March 2023 involved LockBit.
CanadaLockBit was linked to 22 percent of attributed ransomware incidents in 2022.
New Zealand23 percent of ransomware reports to the national response team in 2022 were LockBit.
United StatesAbout 1,700 attacks since 2020, and approximately USD 91 million in ransoms paid, according to the FBI. LockBit accounted for 16 percent of ransomware incidents reported by state and local governments in 2022.
France80 alerts linked to LockBit handled by the national agency since mid-2020, 11 percent of its ransomware cases.

In Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, roughly one ransomware incident in five came from a single service. That concentration is what made LockBit a priority for international law enforcement.

The advisory counted 1,653 alleged victims on LockBit’s leak sites up to the first quarter of 2023. It also warns that leak sites understate the total, because they name only victims who did not pay, and that a victim can be published months after the attack.

Data seized in 2024 filled in the picture. The National Crime Agency reported that the countries hit most were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and China, and that the targets included more than 100 hospitals and healthcare companies.

What Operation Cronos Revealed

On February 20, 2024, the National Crime Agency announced that it had taken control of LockBit’s primary administration environment and its leak site, working with the FBI and partners from nine other countries. Investigators obtained the platform’s source code and seized the StealBit infrastructure, which was spread across three countries. Servers belonging to affiliates were taken down, two people were arrested in Poland and Ukraine, and more than 200 cryptocurrency accounts were frozen.

Several findings matter to any organization dealing with ransomware.

Decryption keys were recovered

The agency reported obtaining more than 1,000 keys at the time of the operation, and later said it and its partners held more than 2,500. It contacted victims directly to offer help, nearly 240 of them in the United Kingdom by May 2024.

Paying did not delete the data

Data belonging to victims who had paid was found on LockBit’s systems, and the agency concluded that the group did not routinely delete stolen data after payment.

Paying did not always decrypt

The agency found numerous cases where the decryptor supplied to a paying victim failed to work, and the victim received no support.

The scale was large

More than 7,000 attacks were built using LockBit’s services between June 2022 and February 2024, and 194 affiliates were identified.

Many affiliates earned nothing

Of those 194 affiliates, 148 built attacks, and up to 114 appear never to have received a ransom payment.

In May 2024 the agency assessed that LockBit was running at limited capacity. Average monthly attacks in the United Kingdom had fallen by 73 percent since February, and the number of active affiliates had dropped to 69. The agency also noted that the group had built a new leak site and tried to appear more active than it was, by reposting old victims and claiming attacks carried out with other ransomware.

What a LockBit Attack Looked Like to the Victim

For the people on the receiving end, a LockBit 3.0 attack had recognizable features, described in the 2023 advisory.

The first sign was usually that systems stopped working. Files would not open, applications failed, and shared drives showed unfamiliar file names. On affected Windows machines the desktop wallpaper was replaced with a message announcing the attack, and file icons were changed. A ransom note in each folder gave instructions for contacting the group.

Behind that visible moment, the preparation had already happened. Volume shadow copies had been deleted, so previous versions of files were gone. Services for databases, backups, and security tools had been stopped. Windows event logs had been cleared, the recycle bin emptied, and the ransomware had deleted its own file after running.

Data had been taken first. The victim’s name then appeared on LockBit’s leak site with a countdown, and the stolen files were published if the deadline passed.

Some victims were hit more than once. In two French cases recorded in the advisory, up to three LockBit strains were found in the same network.

For responders, each of these features is also evidence. The note and wallpaper identify the family. Cleared logs show when the final stage began. The deployment method, often Group Policy or remote execution from a domain controller, shows how far the attacker’s control extended.

What Remains a Threat

The takedown did not end LockBit, and it did not remove the tools or the people.

The operation itself

The group rebuilt after the takedown, announced LockBit 4.0 at the end of 2024 and LockBit 5.0 in 2025, and was still listing new victims on its leak site in 2026. The National Crime Agency’s assessment of an operation at limited capacity describes the months after the takedown.

The leaked builder

Since September 2022, anyone with the LockBit 3.0 builder has been able to generate working ransomware. An attack that produces LockBit-style encryption and notes may have no connection to the original group.

The affiliates

The people who carried out LockBit intrusions did not stop working. Many moved to other ransomware services and brought the same intrusion methods with them.

An organization that sees LockBit indicators today should respond to the intrusion in front of it and not rely on the name to predict what the attacker will do.

How Affiliates Got In and Moved

The techniques and tools below come from the 2023 advisory. Most of the tools are legitimate or freely available, and they remain in use by former affiliates and by others. What each stage looks like in logs is covered in our guide to ransomware attack stages, detection and response.

StageWhat the advisory describesTools the advisory names
Initial accessExposed remote desktop and VPNs entered with guessed or stolen credentials, phishing, and exploitation of internet-facing systems.Exploits for flaws in Fortinet FortiOS, F5 BIG-IP, Fortra GoAnywhere MFT, PaperCut, and Apache Log4j.
DiscoveryNetwork scanning and directory mapping.Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, AdFind, BloodHound.
Credential theftCredential dumping from memory, and collection of saved passwords.Mimikatz, LaZagne, ProcDump, PasswordFox.
Lateral movementRemote execution, remote desktop, and Group Policy used to push the ransomware.PsExec, Impacket.
Remote accessLegitimate remote management and tunneling tools.AnyDesk, Atera, ScreenConnect, Splashtop, TeamViewer, Ngrok, Ligolo.
Defense evasionDisabling endpoint protection and clearing Windows event logs.Backstab, Defender Control, GMER, PCHunter, PowerTool, Process Hacker.
Data theftCompression, then transfer to cloud storage or an attacker’s server.StealBit, 7-Zip, Rclone, MEGA synchronization, WinSCP, FreeFileSync.

Service Providers as a Route to Many Victims

One behavior recorded in the 2023 advisory deserves separate attention. New Zealand’s national response team observed LockBit affiliates compromising managed service providers and then using that position against the providers’ customers. The affiliates either locked the services those customers relied on with a second round of ransomware, or threatened to release the customers’ data.

A managed service provider holds administrative access to many organizations through remote management tools and shared accounts. One intrusion there is worth dozens elsewhere.

For organizations that rely on an outside IT provider, this changes the question from “are we secure” to is the route through our provider secure. Useful checks include:

Access

Ask what access the provider holds, and whether it is limited to what each task needs.

Authentication

Ask how the provider’s staff sign in to your systems, and whether phishing-resistant methods are required.

Monitoring

Watch the provider’s remote management tools in your environment as closely as any other administrative access.

Notification

Check what the contract says about telling you of an incident at the provider, and how quickly.

Cut-off

Confirm that you could remove the provider’s access within minutes if you had to, and who can make that decision.

If You Are Hit by LockBit

The general sequence is in our guide to ransomware attack stages, detection and response. These points are specific to an attack that carries the LockBit name.

1
Keep the encrypted files and the ransom noteThey show which version or builder produced the ransomware, and the files may be recoverable later.
2
Ask about decryption keysReport the incident and ask whether a key applies to your case. The keys recovered in Operation Cronos cover victims attacked before February 2024.
3
Check Group Policy before systems rejoin the domainAffiliates used it to push the ransomware to every machine, and a leftover policy will do so again.
4
Take legal advice on sanctions before any payment is consideredLockBit’s administrator is sanctioned by the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia, and a payment that reaches a sanctioned person can breach sanctions law. The agencies behind the advisory do not encourage payment in any case.

Reduce Exposure

The 2023 advisory’s recommendations address the routes affiliates used.

Remove remote desktop from the internet

Require a VPN with phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication for remote access.

Patch internet-facing systems quickly

Start with vulnerabilities known to be exploited.

Use separate administrator accounts

Apply least privilege, and grant administrator rights only for the time a task needs them.

Protect local administrator passwords

The advisory recommends Microsoft’s Local Administrator Password Solution, so that one stolen local password does not open every machine.

Lengthen passwords

The advisory recommends at least 15 characters.

Segment the network

One compromised system should not be able to reach every server and backup.

Allow only approved software

Application allowlisting stops most of the tools in the table above from running on servers.

Restrict Group Policy changes

Limit who can edit policy and alert on every change.

Limit uploads from servers

Block file-sharing services that servers have no reason to use.

Keep offline, encrypted, immutable backups

Test restoration from them.

Retain PowerShell logs

The advisory recommends enhanced PowerShell logging with at least 180 days of retention.

LockBit Ransomware Response With ThreatDefence

ThreatDefence detects ransomware affiliates by behavior. Our platform watches for the techniques in this profile across endpoint, identity, and network data, whichever affiliate or builder is behind them. Our 24x7 SOC contains confirmed activity under agreed authority.

When a new variant or advisory appears, our threat hunters run a retrospective search across monitored environments. Our responders support organizations hit by LockBit or by attackers using its leaked builder, from scoping to restoration.

Forensic collection in the ThreatDefence portal: artifacts collected from a host, evidence by source, collection progress, fleet hunt results and findings

Experiencing a breach?

Our incident response team answers 24x7, with or without a retainer.

Sources

Talk to Our Experts

Discuss ransomware readiness, incident response retainers, and 24x7 monitoring for your organization.

    I'm an MSP, MSSP, or reseller

    By submitting this form, you accept the terms in our privacy policy.

    Frequently Asked Questions

    What is LockBit ransomware?

    LockBit is ransomware offered as a service. A core group maintains the ransomware and its infrastructure, and affiliates use them to break in, steal data, and encrypt systems. Its predecessor appeared under the name ABCD in September 2019, and later versions have covered Windows, Linux, VMware ESXi, and macOS. A joint advisory from agencies in seven countries describes how it works.

    Is LockBit still active?

    Yes. The February 2024 takedown seized its infrastructure, and in May 2024 the UK National Crime Agency assessed the group as running at limited capacity. It has since rebuilt, released LockBit 4.0 and LockBit 5.0, and continued to list victims through 2026. Attacks also come from unrelated criminals using the leaked LockBit 3.0 builder, which no takedown can recall.

    What is LockBit 3.0?

    LockBit 3.0, also called LockBit Black, is the version released in March 2022. Its builder leaked in September 2022, so criminals with no link to the group can produce their own copies. It checks a machine’s language settings before running, changes the wallpaper and file icons, clears event logs, and deletes itself afterward. Later versions have replaced it within the group’s own program.

    How does LockBit spread through a network?

    Affiliates use stolen administrator credentials with remote desktop, PsExec, and Impacket to move between systems, then push the ransomware to every machine through Group Policy. To establish the deployment path, review privileged logons, services created remotely, and recent Group Policy changes. The same review shows which accounts the attacker controlled, and each of them needs a reset.

    Can LockBit files be decrypted?

    Sometimes. Law enforcement recovered more than 2,500 keys in Operation Cronos, and they cover victims attacked before February 2024. For later attacks, and for copies made with the leaked builder, no general key exists. Report the incident, ask whether a key applies, and keep the encrypted files in case one becomes available.

    What was Operation Cronos?

    Operation Cronos is the law enforcement task force against LockBit, led by the UK National Crime Agency with the FBI and partners from nine other countries. In February 2024 it took over LockBit’s administration environment and leak site, seized the StealBit infrastructure, and froze more than 200 cryptocurrency accounts. Later phases named and sanctioned the group’s administrator and brought further arrests.

    Does paying LockBit guarantee stolen data is deleted?

    No. Investigators found data from victims who had paid still on LockBit’s systems, and the National Crime Agency concluded that the group did not routinely delete stolen data after payment. Any payment decision should assume the data stays in criminal hands. Because the group’s administrator is under sanctions, a payment can also carry legal risk for the payer.