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LockBit is a ransomware-as-a-service operation. A core group develops the ransomware and runs the infrastructure, and affiliates use it to attack organizations in exchange for a share of the proceeds.LockBit was among the most active ransomware operations in the world until an international law enforcement operation disrupted it in February 2024. The disruption damaged the operation without ending it. This profile follows its history in order, then sets out what remains a threat today.
The affiliate model common to most ransomware is described in our guide to ransomware attack stages, detection and response. The 2023 joint advisory and the later law enforcement findings show what LockBit did with that model, and why it grew so large.
It marketed itself. The advisory describes publicity stunts, including paying people to get LockBit tattoos, public criticism of rival ransomware services, and a bounty of one million dollars offered to anyone who could identify the person behind its public persona. All of this was aimed at attracting affiliates.
It made the product easy. Affiliates received a management panel with a point-and-click interface, so that carrying out an attack needed less technical skill. The service handled the encryptor, the leak site, and the payment system.
It built its own tools. LockBit 2.0 introduced StealBit, a purpose-built program for copying data out of a victim’s network. From 2021 affiliates stole data before encrypting and threatened to publish it.
It let affiliates take the money first. According to the advisory, affiliates received ransom payments before passing a share to the core group. Most services worked the other way, and this single policy made LockBit attractive to experienced intruders.
It expanded its reach. Versions were released for Linux and VMware ESXi, and by April 2023 encryptors built for macOS had been seen.
It set rules, and broke them. The ransomware skipped machines configured for a list of excluded languages, a common feature of ransomware developed in Russian-speaking countries. The group also claimed to forbid attacks on certain targets. After an affiliate attacked a children’s hospital in December 2022, LockBit apologized publicly and said the affiliate had been expelled. The National Crime Agency later found that the affiliate had stayed in the program until the takedown.
Because many unconnected affiliates worked under the same name, their methods varied widely. There is no single LockBit technique to block.
The 2023 advisory was written jointly by agencies in seven countries, and several contributed their own figures.
In Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, roughly one ransomware incident in five came from a single service. That concentration is what made LockBit a priority for international law enforcement.
The advisory counted 1,653 alleged victims on LockBit’s leak sites up to the first quarter of 2023. It also warns that leak sites understate the total, because they name only victims who did not pay, and that a victim can be published months after the attack.
Data seized in 2024 filled in the picture. The National Crime Agency reported that the countries hit most were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and China, and that the targets included more than 100 hospitals and healthcare companies.
On February 20, 2024, the National Crime Agency announced that it had taken control of LockBit’s primary administration environment and its leak site, working with the FBI and partners from nine other countries. Investigators obtained the platform’s source code and seized the StealBit infrastructure, which was spread across three countries. Servers belonging to affiliates were taken down, two people were arrested in Poland and Ukraine, and more than 200 cryptocurrency accounts were frozen.
Several findings matter to any organization dealing with ransomware.
The agency reported obtaining more than 1,000 keys at the time of the operation, and later said it and its partners held more than 2,500. It contacted victims directly to offer help, nearly 240 of them in the United Kingdom by May 2024.
Data belonging to victims who had paid was found on LockBit’s systems, and the agency concluded that the group did not routinely delete stolen data after payment.
The agency found numerous cases where the decryptor supplied to a paying victim failed to work, and the victim received no support.
More than 7,000 attacks were built using LockBit’s services between June 2022 and February 2024, and 194 affiliates were identified.
Of those 194 affiliates, 148 built attacks, and up to 114 appear never to have received a ransom payment.
In May 2024 the agency assessed that LockBit was running at limited capacity. Average monthly attacks in the United Kingdom had fallen by 73 percent since February, and the number of active affiliates had dropped to 69. The agency also noted that the group had built a new leak site and tried to appear more active than it was, by reposting old victims and claiming attacks carried out with other ransomware.
For the people on the receiving end, a LockBit 3.0 attack had recognizable features, described in the 2023 advisory.
The first sign was usually that systems stopped working. Files would not open, applications failed, and shared drives showed unfamiliar file names. On affected Windows machines the desktop wallpaper was replaced with a message announcing the attack, and file icons were changed. A ransom note in each folder gave instructions for contacting the group.
Behind that visible moment, the preparation had already happened. Volume shadow copies had been deleted, so previous versions of files were gone. Services for databases, backups, and security tools had been stopped. Windows event logs had been cleared, the recycle bin emptied, and the ransomware had deleted its own file after running.
Data had been taken first. The victim’s name then appeared on LockBit’s leak site with a countdown, and the stolen files were published if the deadline passed.
Some victims were hit more than once. In two French cases recorded in the advisory, up to three LockBit strains were found in the same network.
For responders, each of these features is also evidence. The note and wallpaper identify the family. Cleared logs show when the final stage began. The deployment method, often Group Policy or remote execution from a domain controller, shows how far the attacker’s control extended.
The takedown did not end LockBit, and it did not remove the tools or the people.
The group rebuilt after the takedown, announced LockBit 4.0 at the end of 2024 and LockBit 5.0 in 2025, and was still listing new victims on its leak site in 2026. The National Crime Agency’s assessment of an operation at limited capacity describes the months after the takedown.
Since September 2022, anyone with the LockBit 3.0 builder has been able to generate working ransomware. An attack that produces LockBit-style encryption and notes may have no connection to the original group.
The people who carried out LockBit intrusions did not stop working. Many moved to other ransomware services and brought the same intrusion methods with them.
An organization that sees LockBit indicators today should respond to the intrusion in front of it and not rely on the name to predict what the attacker will do.
The techniques and tools below come from the 2023 advisory. Most of the tools are legitimate or freely available, and they remain in use by former affiliates and by others. What each stage looks like in logs is covered in our guide to ransomware attack stages, detection and response.
One behavior recorded in the 2023 advisory deserves separate attention. New Zealand’s national response team observed LockBit affiliates compromising managed service providers and then using that position against the providers’ customers. The affiliates either locked the services those customers relied on with a second round of ransomware, or threatened to release the customers’ data.
A managed service provider holds administrative access to many organizations through remote management tools and shared accounts. One intrusion there is worth dozens elsewhere.
For organizations that rely on an outside IT provider, this changes the question from “are we secure” to is the route through our provider secure. Useful checks include:
is the route through our provider secure
Ask what access the provider holds, and whether it is limited to what each task needs.
Ask how the provider’s staff sign in to your systems, and whether phishing-resistant methods are required.
Watch the provider’s remote management tools in your environment as closely as any other administrative access.
Check what the contract says about telling you of an incident at the provider, and how quickly.
Confirm that you could remove the provider’s access within minutes if you had to, and who can make that decision.
The general sequence is in our guide to ransomware attack stages, detection and response. These points are specific to an attack that carries the LockBit name.
The 2023 advisory’s recommendations address the routes affiliates used.
Require a VPN with phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication for remote access.
Start with vulnerabilities known to be exploited.
Apply least privilege, and grant administrator rights only for the time a task needs them.
The advisory recommends Microsoft’s Local Administrator Password Solution, so that one stolen local password does not open every machine.
The advisory recommends at least 15 characters.
One compromised system should not be able to reach every server and backup.
Application allowlisting stops most of the tools in the table above from running on servers.
Limit who can edit policy and alert on every change.
Block file-sharing services that servers have no reason to use.
Test restoration from them.
The advisory recommends enhanced PowerShell logging with at least 180 days of retention.
ThreatDefence detects ransomware affiliates by behavior. Our platform watches for the techniques in this profile across endpoint, identity, and network data, whichever affiliate or builder is behind them. Our 24x7 SOC contains confirmed activity under agreed authority.
When a new variant or advisory appears, our threat hunters run a retrospective search across monitored environments. Our responders support organizations hit by LockBit or by attackers using its leaked builder, from scoping to restoration.
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LockBit is ransomware offered as a service. A core group maintains the ransomware and its infrastructure, and affiliates use them to break in, steal data, and encrypt systems. Its predecessor appeared under the name ABCD in September 2019, and later versions have covered Windows, Linux, VMware ESXi, and macOS. A joint advisory from agencies in seven countries describes how it works.
Yes. The February 2024 takedown seized its infrastructure, and in May 2024 the UK National Crime Agency assessed the group as running at limited capacity. It has since rebuilt, released LockBit 4.0 and LockBit 5.0, and continued to list victims through 2026. Attacks also come from unrelated criminals using the leaked LockBit 3.0 builder, which no takedown can recall.
LockBit 3.0, also called LockBit Black, is the version released in March 2022. Its builder leaked in September 2022, so criminals with no link to the group can produce their own copies. It checks a machine’s language settings before running, changes the wallpaper and file icons, clears event logs, and deletes itself afterward. Later versions have replaced it within the group’s own program.
Affiliates use stolen administrator credentials with remote desktop, PsExec, and Impacket to move between systems, then push the ransomware to every machine through Group Policy. To establish the deployment path, review privileged logons, services created remotely, and recent Group Policy changes. The same review shows which accounts the attacker controlled, and each of them needs a reset.
Sometimes. Law enforcement recovered more than 2,500 keys in Operation Cronos, and they cover victims attacked before February 2024. For later attacks, and for copies made with the leaked builder, no general key exists. Report the incident, ask whether a key applies, and keep the encrypted files in case one becomes available.
Operation Cronos is the law enforcement task force against LockBit, led by the UK National Crime Agency with the FBI and partners from nine other countries. In February 2024 it took over LockBit’s administration environment and leak site, seized the StealBit infrastructure, and froze more than 200 cryptocurrency accounts. Later phases named and sanctioned the group’s administrator and brought further arrests.
No. Investigators found data from victims who had paid still on LockBit’s systems, and the National Crime Agency concluded that the group did not routinely delete stolen data after payment. Any payment decision should assume the data stays in criminal hands. Because the group’s administrator is under sanctions, a payment can also carry legal risk for the payer.
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