vCenter CVE-2026-123890 Zero-Day: Patching and Hunting – ThreatDefence
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VMware vCenter CVE-2026-123890 Zero-Day: Patching and Hunting

Harry Morris
Harry Morris · Senior SOC Analyst
Published November 20, 2026

CVE-2026-123890 is an authentication bypass in vCenter’s directory service that gives an unauthenticated attacker the administrator@vsphere.local account. Mandiant says a China-nexus group has exploited it since early September 2026.

TL;DR

Patch to vCenter 8.0 U3m, 9.0.2.0200 or 9.1.1.0200 now, and restrict TCP port 2012 to trusted hosts.

At a glance
SeverityCritical
StatusActive
ExploitedYes. Mandiant says the China-nexus group ARMORY CASTLE exploited CVE-2026-123890 as a zero-day from early September 2026. Not in CISA KEV on November 20, 2026. No public exploit
ProductVMware vCenter Server 7.0, 8.0, 9.0 and 9.1, VMware Cloud Foundation 5.x and 9.x, Telco Cloud Platform and Telco Cloud Infrastructure. SDDC Manager and VMware Tools for Windows for the other CVEs
CVEsCVE-2026-123890, CVE-2026-123891, CVE-2026-123892, CVE-2026-123893, CVE-2026-123894
Fixed invCenter 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200 and 8.0 U3m, released November 19, 2026. VCF 5.x customers apply vCenter 8.0 U3m and SDDC Manager 5.2.5. vCenter 7.0 is affected and has no public fix. No workaround

On November 19, 2026, Broadcom published VMSA-2026-0009, a critical advisory for vCenter, SDDC Manager and VMware Tools. The flaw that matters most is CVE-2026-123890, an authentication bypass in the VMware Directory Service (vmdir) of vCenter Server, rated 9.8. Broadcom says an attacker “with network access to vCenter may exploit this issue to bypass authentication and gain unauthorized access to the system.” There is no workaround.

The flaw was already in use. Broadcom credits Mandiant with the report, and on November 20 Google Threat Intelligence Group published how ARMORY CASTLE, a suspected PRC-nexus espionage group formerly tracked as UNC5221, exploited it from early September 2026 with a tool Google calls BONESAW. The attackers used it to create vCenter administrator accounts, steal the vCenter SAML signing key, take over ESXi hosts and copy Active Directory databases out of virtual machine disks.

The same advisory fixes lower-rated flaws: a SQL injection, an authenticated command injection that runs code on the appliance and a local privilege escalation in SDDC Manager, and a SAML token signature bypass in VMware Tools for Windows.

CVE-2026-123890 is a new bug, separate from the July vCenter flaws in VMSA-2026-0006. Broadcom says every vCenter below the November builds needs this update, including servers patched in July. ARMORY CASTLE ran BONESAW against a server that already had the July fix.

CVE CVSS EPSS CISA KEV Fixed in
CVE-2026-123890 9.8 (CVSS 3.1), Broadcom Not yet scored No vCenter 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200 or 8.0 U3m, VCF 5.2.5
CVE-2026-123891 8.1 (CVSS 3.1), Broadcom Not yet scored No SDDC Manager 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0100 or 5.2.5
CVE-2026-123892 7.2 (CVSS 3.1), Broadcom Not yet scored No SDDC Manager 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0100 or 5.2.5
CVE-2026-123893 6.7 (CVSS 3.1), Broadcom Not yet scored No SDDC Manager 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0100 or 5.2.5
CVE-2026-123894 6.7 (CVSS 3.1), Broadcom Not yet scored No VMware Tools for Windows 13.1.5.0 or 12.5.5

CVSS and EPSS from NVD and FIRST, exploitation status from the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, checked November 20, 2026.

What is confirmed

Point Status
Fixed in vCenter 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200 and 8.0 U3m, released November 19, 2026 Broadcom VMSA-2026-0009
No workaround Broadcom
Unauthenticated, needs only network access to vCenter Broadcom, CVSS 3.1 vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N
The attack runs over DCE/RPC on TCP port 2012 and gives a session as administrator@vsphere.local Google Threat Intelligence Group
Exploited as a zero-day from early September 2026 by ARMORY CASTLE Google Threat Intelligence Group, Mandiant
vCenter 7.0 affected, no public fix Broadcom says contact support for extended support contracts. Google says BONESAW works against 7.x and 8.x
ESX hosts not affected by the flaw itself Broadcom
Public exploit None. BONESAW has not been released
CISA KEV Not listed in the catalog released November 18, 2026

How the flaw works

vCenter’s single sign-on service keeps its users, groups and signing keys in the VMware Directory Service. Besides LDAP, vmdir listens on TCP port 2012, a DCE/RPC control interface that vCenter components use to talk to single sign-on.

One of the RPC services on that port authenticates callers with the Secure Remote Password protocol (SRP-6a), which lets both sides agree a session key without sending the password. Google found that the server builds part of this exchange from a UUID version 1, which is made from a timestamp and so can be predicted. An attacker who predicts it can work out the shared session key without knowing any password, and the server then treats the attacker as administrator@vsphere.local, the top single sign-on account.

From that session, BONESAW uses another vmdir RPC interface to copy /storage/db/vmware-vmdir/data.mdb, the directory database. That file holds the private key the vCenter Security Token Service uses to sign SAML tokens. With the key, an attacker can sign their own tokens for any user, which bypasses multi-factor authentication and survives password resets. This is often called a Golden SAML attack.

July’s CVE-2026-59309 was also an authentication bypass in vmdir, but through crafted LDAP packets on ports 389 and 636. CVE-2026-123890 is a different flaw in the RPC interface, so the July fix does not cover it.

Practical exploit effort

The 9.8 score says what happens when the exploit works. How much work it takes depends mostly on who you are and where you are on the network.

No public exploit exists, but a working one has been in use for months. Google says BONESAW was used in early September, and its Go build metadata gives July 13, 2026, about four months before the patch. Google notes that the build time can be faked. No researcher had published a patch analysis or proof of concept by November 20. Rapid7 said it would add an unauthenticated vulnerability check on November 20, which detects the flaw and does not exploit it.

The attacker needs to reach TCP port 2012. This is the main practical barrier. Port 443 is the vCenter port organizations most often expose, and the attack does not use it. Port 2012 is an internal service that few organizations deliberately publish to the internet. In the case Google described, ARMORY CASTLE did not reach vCenter from outside. It first exploited a BeyondTrust Remote Support zero-day (CVE-2026-102764), moved to an internal Linux appliance with no endpoint protection, scanned internal ranges for ports 443, 2012 and 389, and then ran BONESAW. Treat CVE-2026-123890 as a second-stage flaw for an attacker already inside, and an internet-scale flaw only where 2012 is exposed.

Rebuilding the exploit is skilled work, not a quick copy. The flaw sits in a binary RPC protocol with a cryptographic handshake, and an attacker has to understand SRP-6a, the RPC interface and how the server generates its UUIDs before predicting one. Once the patch is reverse engineered, the root cause Google has now published gives a strong lead. Our view is that a capable exploit developer could rebuild it in days to a few weeks, and that a public version is likely to follow.

The attack is quiet at the network level and noisy afterwards. The bypass itself is a short RPC exchange on port 2012. What follows leaves clearer traces: a new single sign-on administrator account, SSH enabled through the appliance management API, tools written to /tmp, and logins to ESXi hosts.

A working exploit gives far more than vCenter. With administrator@vsphere.local and the SAML signing key, an attacker controls every ESXi host vCenter manages and every virtual machine on them. ARMORY CASTLE logged in to ESXi as vpxuser, enabled SSH as root and read guest disks directly from the datastore. From domain controller disks it copied the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) and the SYSTEM and SECURITY registry hives, which give every domain password hash without touching the domain controller.

Root on the appliance took one more step. Google says the attackers used gdb to attach to a running process and set the setuid bit on /bin/env, then used it to get root on the vCenter appliance.

Our assessment of the effort, as of November 20:

CVE-2026-123890 (vCenter) CVE-2026-123891 to 123893 (SDDC Manager) CVE-2026-123894 (VMware Tools for Windows)
Public exploit No. A private tool has been used since September No No
Credentials needed None Yes, an SDDC Manager account, admin for the privilege escalation A privileged process inside a Windows VM
Network access TCP 2012 on vCenter SDDC Manager interface None, local to the guest
Effort for code execution Specialist work today, likely to drop once a patch analysis is published Moderate once an attacker has an account Not code execution. Guest privilege escalation where guest alias mapping is configured
Most exposed vCenter with port 2012 reachable from user, server or partner networks VCF environments with shared or weak SDDC Manager accounts Windows VMs with guest alias mapping
Loudest signal New single sign-on admin accounts, SSH turned on, logins to ESXi as root Database errors and unexpected processes on SDDC Manager Guest operations under an unexpected account

For a state-backed group, CVE-2026-123890 has already been a reliable way to take over a whole vSphere environment. For most attackers today, it needs a foothold inside the network and an exploit they do not have yet. Patch as an emergency change anyway: vCenter has been in the CISA KEV catalog repeatedly, and July’s CVE-2026-59310 was added to KEV on August 18, 2026.

Who is affected, in priority order

  1. vCenter Server with TCP port 2012 reachable from the internet, or from user, partner or general server networks. Check this first. On a well segmented network, only vCenter itself and other vCenter nodes need it.
  2. Every vCenter Server 8.0 below 8.0 U3m, 9.0 below 9.0.2.0200 and 9.1 below 9.1.1.0200, including servers patched for VMSA-2026-0006 in July.
  3. vCenter Server 7.0. vSphere 7 reached the end of general support on October 2, 2025. Broadcom lists no public fix and says to contact support if you have an extended support contract. Google says BONESAW works against 7.x. Broadcom says versions 6.5 and 6.7 should be presumed affected.
  4. VMware Cloud Foundation 5.x and 9.x, which include vCenter and SDDC Manager. VCF 5.x needs vCenter 8.0 U3m through the asynchronous patching process in KB 88287, and SDDC Manager 5.2.5.
  5. Telco Cloud Platform 3.0, 4.x, 5.0.x, 5.1.x and 5.2, and Telco Cloud Infrastructure 3.0, per Broadcom KB463116.
  6. Windows VMs running VMware Tools 11.x, 12.x or 13.x with guest alias mapping configured, for CVE-2026-123894.

Enhanced Linked Mode makes no difference. Broadcom says the flaw is in vCenter itself. ESX, NSX, VCF Operations, VCF Automation, Workstation and Fusion are not affected.

Affected and fixed versions

Product Affected Fixed
vCenter Server 9.1.x Below 9.1.1.0200 9.1.1.0200
vCenter Server 9.0.x Below 9.0.2.0200 9.0.2.0200
vCenter Server 8.0 Below 8.0 U3m 8.0 U3m
vCenter Server 7.0 All No public fix. Extended support customers contact Broadcom
VMware Cloud Foundation 5.x All vCenter 8.0 U3m (KB 88287) and SDDC Manager 5.2.5
SDDC Manager Below the fixed builds 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0100, 5.2.5
VMware Tools for Windows 11.x, 12.x, 13.x 13.1.5.0, 12.5.5 (12.4.10 for 32-bit Windows)
Telco Cloud Platform and Infrastructure See KB463116 See KB463116

Points from Broadcom’s questions and answers document:

  • The fixes are cumulative and include the earlier VMSA-2026-0008 fixes.
  • vCenter updates are not eligible for vCenter Quick Patch.
  • Updating vCenter makes the management interfaces unavailable for a short time. Running VMs are not affected.
  • vCenter 8.0 U3m and 9.0.2.0200 block a later upgrade to VCF 9.1.1. Either upgrade vCenter to 9.1.1 directly or wait for VCF 9.1.2 (KB 67077).

How to check your exposure

Find the vCenter version in the vSphere Client under Help, About, in the appliance management interface on port 5480 under Summary, or from the appliance shell:

vpxd -v

With PowerCLI, list the version and build of each connected vCenter:

$global:DefaultVIServers | Select-Object Name, Version, Build

Check whether port 2012 is reachable from places it should not be. Run this from a user workstation, a general server network and, for internet exposure, an outside host. The command only tests the connection:

nc -vz -w 3 vcenter.example.internal 2012

A connection from anywhere other than another vCenter node means the port needs restricting.

On the appliance, look for the files and accounts Google reported. These commands only read state:

ls -la /tmp/123 /tmp/sss /tmp/dbr /tmp/123.key /tmp/gdb_file /tmp/rar /tmp/123.rar 2>/dev/null
ls -la /usr/bin/vmtoolscs 2>/dev/null
ls -la /bin/env
find / -name 'ActiveSer.jsp' -o -name 'u.jsp' 2>/dev/null
systemctl list-unit-files --type=service | grep -vi -E 'vmware|vmw|systemd|ssh|cron|rsyslog|network|ntp|dbus'

/bin/env should not have the setuid bit (-rwsr-xr-x). Review the single sign-on users in the vSphere Client under Administration, Single Sign On, Users and Groups for accounts nobody created, such as names beginning sps- in the vsphere.local domain.

Mitigation and remediation

Do these in this order:

  1. Patch vCenter to 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200 or 8.0 U3m. Broadcom calls this an emergency change. For VCF 5.x, apply vCenter 8.0 U3m through KB 88287, then SDDC Manager 5.2.5.
  2. Restrict TCP port 2012 with a firewall or the appliance’s own firewall, so only other vCenter nodes can reach it. Google also recommends limiting ports 443, 22 and 5480 to administration hosts and filtering outbound traffic from the appliance.
  3. For vCenter 7.0, apply step 2 straight away, contact Broadcom if you have extended support, and plan the upgrade. Broadcom recommends moving to VCF 9.1.
  4. Check for compromise before you call it done. Patching closes the flaw, but it does not remove accounts, keys or backdoors an attacker already planted. Run the checks above and the hunts below over at least the period since September 1, 2026.
  5. If you find signs of compromise, replace the Security Token Service signing certificate and reset single sign-on credentials. A stolen signing key keeps working after the patch until the certificate is replaced.
  6. Patch SDDC Manager to 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0100 or 5.2.5, and VMware Tools for Windows to 13.1.5.0 or 12.5.5. Broadcom says stopping or removing VMware Tools, or disabling guest operations, does not work around CVE-2026-123894.
  7. Send vCenter and ESXi logs to your SIEM. Google recommends remote syslog from the appliance and logging dropped connections, and points to Mandiant’s VCSA hardening and logging tool.
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Threat hunting

Hunt for who can reach port 2012, what ARMORY CASTLE did after the bypass, and the infrastructure Google published. Go back to at least September 1, 2026.

Indicators of compromise

Google lists these addresses as a suspected obfuscation network, likely compromised routers and firewalls used to relay traffic. They may be reassigned, so treat a match as a lead.

Indicator Type Context
103.147.251[.]5, 103.190.38[.]3 IP ARMORY CASTLE relay network
118.174.128[.]34, 118.174.128[.]36, 118.174.128[.]38 IP ARMORY CASTLE relay network
176.9.89[.]66, 185.71.15[.]109 IP ARMORY CASTLE relay network
220.121.128[.]41, 222.108.77[.]44 IP ARMORY CASTLE relay network
61.216.56[.]127, 81.45.89[.]43 IP ARMORY CASTLE relay network
/tmp/123 File BONESAW, the CVE-2026-123890 exploit
/tmp/sss File SAWSNAKE, forges SAML tokens from the stolen key
/tmp/dbr File BEARBONES, a backdoored Dropbear SSH server, run on ports 53 and 33992
/usr/bin/vmtoolscs File LAZYBONES, a backdoor using Slack for command and control, run as a systemd service
ActiveSer.jsp File SLIMSAVAGE web shell
u.jsp File CAGEMATCH upload web shell
SSH-2.0-pulsesecure_ SSH banner BEARBONES. Google used it to find compromised relay devices on high ports
/vmfs/volumes/<volume>/.a Directory Hidden staging directory on ESXi datastores
vmfs_browser.py, vmfs-pydist.tar.gz, o.tar.gz Files Used on ESXi to read guest disks and archive the output

Google gives no file hashes in the public post. Its YARA rules and full indicators are in a Google Threat Intelligence collection for registered users.

Example KQL for Microsoft Defender and Microsoft Sentinel

The KQL below is example code for Microsoft Defender for Endpoint advanced hunting and Microsoft Sentinel. Adapt table and field names to your environment and test each query before relying on it. The vCenter appliance and ESXi do not run Defender for Endpoint, so most of these queries read firewall logs and syslog from the appliance and hosts.

Hunt 1: who connects to vCenter on port 2012

// Example: Sentinel CommonSecurityLog, every source that reached TCP 2012 on vCenter
let vcenter = dynamic(["10.0.0.10", "10.0.0.11"]);   // your vCenter addresses
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(90d)
| where DestinationIP in (vcenter) and DestinationPort == 2012
| summarize Connections=count(), FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated),
            Actions=make_set(DeviceAction, 5)
    by SourceIP, DeviceVendor
| order by FirstSeen asc

Expect other vCenter nodes only. Any workstation, appliance or external address on this list deserves a look, and allowed connections from it are a priority.

Hunt 2: internal scanning for vCenter ports

// Example: Sentinel CommonSecurityLog, one source probing 2012, 389, 5480 or 443 across many hosts
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(90d)
| where DestinationPort in (2012, 389, 5480, 9080)
| summarize Targets=dcount(DestinationIP), Ports=make_set(DestinationPort, 10),
            FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated)
    by SourceIP
| where Targets > 10
| order by Targets desc

ARMORY CASTLE ran nmap across internal ranges for these ports from a compromised Linux appliance. Vulnerability scanners will match, so exclude their addresses after you confirm them.

Hunt 3: SSH turned on and tools in /tmp on the appliance

// Example: Sentinel Syslog from the vCenter appliance and ESXi hosts
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(90d)
| where SyslogMessage has_any ("/rest/appliance/access/ssh", "/tmp/123", "/tmp/sss", "/tmp/dbr",
                               "vmtoolscs", "gdb -pid", "chmod u+s", "vmfs_browser", "pulsesecure_",
                               "curl -o /tmp", "ActiveSer.jsp", "u.jsp")
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, ProcessName, SyslogMessage
| order by TimeGenerated asc

Enabling SSH through the management API is normal during maintenance, so match each event to a change ticket. Google saw SSH turned on, used to read secrets, and turned off again shortly after.

Hunt 4: new single sign-on and administrator accounts

// Example: Sentinel Syslog, vCenter SSO audit events (audit_events.log) and vCenter permission events
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(90d)
| where SyslogMessage has_any ("com.vmware.sso.PrincipalManagement", "PermissionAddedEvent",
                               "PermissionUpdatedEvent", "RoleAddedEvent")
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, ProcessName, SyslogMessage
| order by TimeGenerated asc

vCenter 7.0 and later write single sign-on user and group changes to /var/log/audit/sso-events/audit_events.log, so make sure that file is forwarded. The actor created a local administrator named sps- followed by a random string in vsphere.local, and BONESAW can grant administrator rights on the vCenter root folder. Review every account and permission added since September.

Hunt 5: root logins to ESXi and new SSH keys

// Example: Sentinel Syslog from ESXi hosts, SSH and host client logins, and changes to root's keys
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(90d)
| where SyslogMessage has_any ("Accepted password for root", "Accepted publickey for root",
                               "SSH session was opened for", "vpxuser", "authorized_keys", "esx.audit.ssh.enabled")
| summarize Events=count(), FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated),
            Sample=any(SyslogMessage)
    by Computer, ProcessName
| order by FirstSeen asc

vpxuser is the account vCenter uses to manage hosts and logs in to them constantly. A host client (ESXUI) login as vpxuser from a person’s address, or SSH to ESXi as root outside maintenance, is unusual.

Hunt 6: connections to the published addresses

// Example: Sentinel CommonSecurityLog and Defender for Endpoint, traffic to or from the Google indicators
let iocs = dynamic(["103.147.251.5","103.190.38.3","118.174.128.34","118.174.128.36","118.174.128.38",
                    "176.9.89.66","185.71.15.109","220.121.128.41","222.108.77.44","61.216.56.127","81.45.89.43"]);
union
  (CommonSecurityLog | where TimeGenerated > ago(90d)
      | where SourceIP in (iocs) or DestinationIP in (iocs)
      | project TimeGenerated, Source="Firewall", SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction),
  (DeviceNetworkEvents | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
      | where RemoteIP in (iocs)
      | project TimeGenerated=Timestamp, Source="Endpoint", SourceIP=LocalIP, DestinationIP=RemoteIP,
                DestinationPort=RemotePort, DeviceAction=ActionType)
| order by TimeGenerated asc

Hunt 7: Active Directory secrets appearing off the domain controllers

// Example: Defender for Endpoint, NTDS.dit and registry hive copies on hosts that are not domain controllers
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FileName in~ ("ntds.dit", "SYSTEM", "SECURITY")
| where FolderPath !startswith @"C:\Windows\NTDS" and FolderPath !startswith @"C:\Windows\System32\config"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc

Reading guest disks from the datastore never touches the domain controller, so this only catches the files if they land on a monitored host. Unexpected Kerberos ticket or password use for privileged accounts after September is the other place to look.

Responding to a suspected compromise

  1. Keep the evidence before patching or rebooting: appliance logs, /tmp, the systemd units, the single sign-on audit trail, ESXi logs, and if possible a snapshot or memory image of the vCenter appliance.
  2. Isolate vCenter from all networks except a management host, and block the published addresses.
  3. Remove attacker access: unknown single sign-on accounts and permissions, SSH keys in root’s authorized_keys on vCenter and ESXi, the LAZYBONES service and the web shells. A rebuilt appliance restored from a clean configuration is safer than cleaning in place.
  4. Replace the Security Token Service signing certificate and reset administrator@vsphere.local and other single sign-on credentials, since forged SAML tokens keep working until the key changes.
  5. Rotate ESXi root passwords and check every host for new local accounts and SSH keys.
  6. Treat Active Directory as compromised if domain controllers run on the affected hosts: reset the KRBTGT password twice, rotate privileged and service account passwords, and review recent logins.

Timeline

  • 2023: Google says ARMORY CASTLE has exploited edge and security appliances for initial access since 2023.
  • July 13, 2026: Build date in the BONESAW binary’s Go metadata (can be faked).
  • July 29, 2026: Broadcom publishes VMSA-2026-0006, fixing vCenter CVE-2026-59309 and CVE-2026-59310.
  • August 18, 2026: CISA adds CVE-2026-59310 to KEV.
  • Early September 2026: ARMORY CASTLE exploits CVE-2026-123890 with BONESAW, against a vCenter already patched for CVE-2026-59309.
  • October 16, 2026: CISA adds BeyondTrust CVE-2026-102764, ARMORY CASTLE’s entry point in this campaign, to KEV.
  • November 19, 2026: Broadcom publishes VMSA-2026-0009 with fixed vCenter, SDDC Manager and VMware Tools builds, and credits Mandiant.
  • November 20, 2026: Google Threat Intelligence Group publishes its ARMORY CASTLE report. CVE-2026-123890 is not yet in CISA KEV.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is CVE-2026-123890 being exploited? Yes. Mandiant says ARMORY CASTLE, a suspected PRC-nexus espionage group, exploited it as a zero-day from early September 2026. Broadcom’s advisory does not mention exploitation, and the CVE was not in CISA KEV on November 20, 2026.

Which vCenter versions fix CVE-2026-123890? vCenter 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200 and 8.0 U3m. VMware Cloud Foundation 5.x needs vCenter 8.0 U3m and SDDC Manager 5.2.5. There is no workaround.

We patched vCenter in July. Are we safe? No. CVE-2026-123890 is a different flaw from the July CVE-2026-59309 and CVE-2026-59310, and the attackers used it against a server that had the July fix. Every vCenter below the November builds needs this update.

How hard is CVE-2026-123890 to exploit? There is no public exploit, and rebuilding one takes skilled work on a binary RPC protocol and its cryptographic handshake. The bigger barrier is reaching TCP port 2012, which most organizations do not expose to the internet. ARMORY CASTLE reached it from inside after breaking in through a BeyondTrust appliance.

Is vCenter 7.0 affected? Yes. Google says the exploit works against 7.x, and vSphere 7 is past the end of general support. Broadcom lists no public fix and asks extended support customers to contact it. Restrict port 2012 now and plan the upgrade.

Does blocking port 2012 protect us? It removes the network path the exploit uses, so it is the best interim step, but Broadcom lists no official workaround. Keep 2012 open only between vCenter nodes, and patch anyway.

Are ESXi hosts affected? The flaw is in vCenter, and Broadcom says ESX is not affected. But an attacker with vCenter administrator rights controls every host it manages, and ARMORY CASTLE logged in to ESXi as root and read guest disks.

Is patching enough if we were already compromised? No. The patch does not remove accounts, SSH keys, backdoors or a stolen SAML signing key. Hunt back to September, and replace the Security Token Service signing certificate if you find signs of compromise.

How ThreatDefence is responding

ThreatDefence has added CVE-2026-123890 and the other VMSA-2026-0009 CVEs, together with the ARMORY CASTLE indicators, to our vulnerability and threat intelligence. Across all monitored environments, our SOC is:

  • identifying vCenter servers below the fixed builds and checking whether TCP port 2012 is reachable beyond vCenter nodes
  • reviewing connections to the published addresses and internal scanning of vCenter ports back to September
  • watching for new single sign-on administrator accounts, SSH being turned on, root logins to ESXi and tools written to /tmp
  • helping customers patch and, where needed, investigate and rotate single sign-on signing keys

If you want help finding vCenter across your environment or checking for signs of compromise, contact us. Read more about our managed detection and response. The same Broadcom release also covers Apache HTTP Server in Cloud Foundation products (VMSA-2026-0010), covered in our Apache CVE-2026-119618 advisory.

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