On November 16, 2026, websites that load Optimizely Web Experimentation began serving malicious JavaScript to their visitors. The code was not on the websites themselves. It had been added to the customers’ Optimizely projects, so it arrived inside the normal Optimizely snippet, from Optimizely’s own domain, with a valid certificate. Report URI, which found the attack, checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found 188 infected, belonging to 178 organizations, including Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA and HSBC. It considers the real number higher, because it could only check snippets it found in time. Some reports call the campaign OPTIMJACK. Optimizely confirmed the incident on its status page: an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation to add JavaScript to some customer projects. The company has since said the flaw was in the account signup flow. It reports that the vulnerability is fixed, the injected code is removed and affected accounts are secured. Every infected snippet was clean by 23:11 UTC on November 16. The cleanup does not close the incident for customers. A site that served the code needs to know for how long, what its visitors were exposed to, and whether anything else in its Optimizely account changed. How the attack worked Each Optimizely Web customer loads a snippet from cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project id>.js. The snippet contains Optimizely’s code, the customer’s experiments, and an optional Project JavaScript field that runs on every page before anything else in the snippet. The attacker added a loader to Project JavaScript and left the rest of each snippet untouched. Report URI saw these forms of it: a plain script tag that loads https://1688360.cc/track.js, in most snippets the same URL encoded in base64 and decoded with atob(), so a search for the domain finds nothing a complete copy of the payload embedded in the loader, which runs through eval if the remote script is blocked or slow This was not cache poisoning: the CDN served exactly what was in the project. Customers who self-host the snippet on their own domain were affected as well, because the content still comes from the same Optimizely project. Optimizely’s own snippets for www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com were infected. What the injected code did Every visitor received the same script, track.js, with every feature active: Crypto address swapping. It finds wallet addresses for Bitcoin, Ethereum and other EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin, and replaces them with the attacker’s in page text, forms, links, the clipboard and outgoing requests. This happens inside the page and needs no network connection. Card skimming, added at 13:43 UTC. It watches form submissions and POST requests for a valid card number, expiry date and security code and sends them to 1688360.cc/card.php. Cards typed into a hosted payment frame, such as Stripe or Adyen fields, were out of its reach. Cards typed into a site’s own form fields were not. Cookie and screenshot theft. When it swaps an address near payment wording, it sends the page URL, every cookie JavaScript can read, and a screenshot of the page to 1688360.cc/hit.php. Cookies marked HttpOnly are not exposed. iPhone and iPad exploit loaders. On iOS it loads a router script, boot.js, from separate .icu domains, which picks an exploit chain by iOS version: the Coruna kit for iOS 13 to 17 and DarkSword for iOS 18. On iOS 18.6 or earlier the page reloads every 60 seconds to retry, which is a visible symptom. Hudson Rock, which recovered the files independently, is careful about the iOS part: its tests show what the router served to scanners, not a compromised iPhone. Treat it as a reason to update devices, not as proof of infection. The attacker rebuilt the payload 26 times during the day. Verified crypto theft was about $7,000. The number of cards and cookies taken is not known. Who is exposed, in priority order Organizations that use Optimizely Web Experimentation, whether or not Optimizely has notified them. Your site may have served the code to your customers. Sites that take card details in their own form fields on pages that load the Optimizely snippet. Cards entered there after 13:43 UTC on November 16 may have been captured. Sites that keep session tokens or other secrets in cookies JavaScript can read. Those cookies could be sent to the attacker. Organizations whose staff browsed affected sites on November 16, especially on iPhones and iPads that are behind on updates, and anyone who made a crypto payment from a browser that day. Sites that load Kissmetrics, StorifyMe or minute-ly scripts. Hudson Rock found the same actor’s loader in scripts from these services between November 13 and 16. The shared code and hosting suggest a link, but not necessarily one entry point. Exposure window Time (UTC) What it means for exposure November 13 to 16 Earlier wave: webshell.lol/get.js loaded through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly scripts November 16, 04:21 First infected Optimizely snippet observed November 16, 08:28 1688360.cc/track.js first seen on a live site. Address swapping starts November 16, 13:43 Card skimmer added November 16, 17:13 to 17:57 Second iOS exploit host added November 16, about 20:40 to 21:10 Mass cleanup of infected snippets November 16, 23:11 Every infected snippet is clean Your own window depends on when your project was changed. Your Optimizely change history is the record of that. How to check your Optimizely projects Read the Project JavaScript of every project, and the custom code of every experiment, variation, page and extension. Look for 1688360.cc, webshell.lol, atob(, eval( and any script you did not write. Open the change history for each project and review November 13 to 17. Any change to Project JavaScript that you cannot tie to a named colleague and a reason is a finding. Export the history before it ages out. Check the snippet your site serves now: curl -s https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project id>.js \ | grep -n -o -E '1688360\.cc|webshell\.lol|aHR0cHM6Ly8xNjg4MzYw|_k7|__k7b|02111110' | sort | uniq -c No output means none of the known markers are present. aHR0cHM6Ly8xNjg4MzYw is the start of the payload URL in base64. If you self-host the snippet, run the same search against your own copy. Find out what your site served on the day. If you archive third-party scripts, or your CDN or monitoring keeps copies, compare the November 16 snippet with the day before. Public scan archives such as urlscan.io may also hold captures of your pages from that day. Review the account: collaborators, roles, API tokens and integrations. Remove what you do not recognize and rotate the tokens. Mitigation and remediation For organizations that use Optimizely Web: Remove anything you did not write from Project JavaScript and experiment code, and confirm the served snippet is clean. Rotate Optimizely API tokens and review who can edit project code. Require single sign-on with multifactor authentication for the account, and limit code access to the people who need it. Treat cards as exposed if they were typed into your own form fields on a page with the snippet between 13:43 and 23:11 UTC on November 16. Involve your payment provider and your legal and privacy teams. Invalidate sessions and rotate any secret that lives in a cookie JavaScript can read. Decide on notification. Your site may have served malicious code to customers, which can carry reporting duties depending on what was exposed. Block the indicators below at DNS, proxy and firewall, including subdomains. Tighten your Content Security Policy. Report URI tested the policies of affected organizations: 68 had none, 50 had a policy that allowed both the payload and the data theft, and only 24 blocked the payload. The lessons: Allowing cdn.optimizely.com gives no protection, because the malicious code came from that host. 'strict-dynamic' trusts any script that a trusted script inserts, which let the second stage through. 'unsafe-eval' let the embedded copy run even where the remote script was blocked. Optimizely’s own documentation asks customers to allow it for some features. A narrow connect-src stopped the card, cookie and screenshot theft. It cannot stop address swapping, which happens inside the page. Take card entry out of reach. Hosted payment fields in an iframe were not readable by the skimmer. Monitor the scripts your pages load: alert when a third-party file changes, when it starts calling a new host, and on CSP violation reports for hosts you have never seen. For your own users: Update iPhones and iPads to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later. Check any crypto payment made from a browser on November 16 against the address you meant to pay. Watch card statements if you paid by card on an affected site that day. Free SOC trialWant this watched across your environment without building the hunts yourself? Our 24x7 SOC monitors your endpoints, servers and cloud during a free trial.Start a free trialThreat hunting The hunts answer two questions: did any device in your environment load the payload or contact the attacker’s servers, and which devices visited sites carrying Optimizely during the window. The attacker’s main domain, 1688360.cc, was suspended at 00:37 UTC on November 17, so look back, not forward. Example KQL for Microsoft Defender and Microsoft Sentinel The KQL below is example code for Microsoft Defender for Endpoint advanced hunting and Microsoft Sentinel. Adapt table and field names to your environment and test each query before relying on it. Hunt 1: connections to the attacker’s domains // Example: Defender for Endpoint and firewall or proxy logs, any contact with the campaign's domains let optimjack_domains = dynamic(["1688360.cc", "webshell.lol", "linkforge.cc", "5vobauua3ojpklx.icu", "eil786npto9u5bq.icu", "l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo.icu", "je4ft3gn8vxudum.icu", "q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu.icu", "ios-hack.icu", "p55abnw2pnsz0bo.icu", "1y69gy2mdzaltz1.icu", "gm38duxoihbmy5o.icu"]); union isfuzzy=true (DeviceNetworkEvents | where Timestamp > datetime(2026-11-09) | where RemoteUrl has_any (optimjack_domains) | project TimeGenerated = Timestamp, Source = "defender", Device = DeviceName, Account = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Process = InitiatingProcessFileName, Destination = RemoteUrl, RemoteIP), (CommonSecurityLog | where TimeGenerated > datetime(2026-11-09) | where DestinationHostName has_any (optimjack_domains) or RequestURL has_any (optimjack_domains) | project TimeGenerated, Source = DeviceVendor, Device = SourceHostName, Account = SourceUserName, Process = "", Destination = coalesce(RequestURL, DestinationHostName), RemoteIP = DestinationIP) | order by TimeGenerated asc A hit on 1688360.cc means a browser loaded an infected page. A hit on one of the .icu domains points to an iPhone or iPad that was sent to the exploit router. Hunt 2: what the browser fetched and what it sent Proxy logs that record the full URL show how far a session went. A POST to card.php or hit.php means data left the browser. // Example: Sentinel CommonSecurityLog (web proxy), payload and collection paths on the campaign's hosts CommonSecurityLog | where TimeGenerated between (datetime(2026-11-13) .. datetime(2026-11-18)) | where RequestURL has_any ("1688360.cc", "webshell.lol", ".icu/") | extend Stage = case( RequestURL has "/card.php", "card data sent", RequestURL has "/hit.php", "cookies and screenshot sent", RequestURL has "/track.js", "payload loaded", RequestURL has "/get.js", "earlier-wave loader", RequestURL has "/boot.js", "iOS router loaded", RequestURL has_any ("/A8/", "/B9/", "/D11/", "/D12/", "/C10/", "/JIUJIU888/"), "iOS exploit stage requested", "other") | where Stage != "other" | project TimeGenerated, SourceUserName, SourceIP, Stage, RequestMethod, RequestURL, RequestClientApplication | order by TimeGenerated asc Hunt 3: devices that loaded Optimizely snippets during the window This does not show an infection. It lists devices and users that visited sites carrying Optimizely while infected snippets were being served, so you know who to ask about payments and which phones to update first. // Example: Defender for Endpoint, browsers that contacted Optimizely's snippet host during the exposure window DeviceNetworkEvents | where Timestamp between (datetime(2026-11-16 04:00) .. datetime(2026-11-16 23:15)) | where RemoteUrl has "cdn.optimizely.com" | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe", "brave.exe", "safari", "Google Chrome", "Microsoft Edge", "firefox") | summarize Requests=count(), FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName | order by Requests desc Hunt 4: the campaign’s server addresses Domains can be missing from logs that record only addresses. These are the addresses the domains resolved to during the attack. They belong to a cloud provider and may be reassigned, so treat matches outside November 9 to 17 with caution. // Example: firewall logs, connections to the addresses the campaign's domains resolved to let optimjack_ips = dynamic(["136.113.106.136", "34.96.213.201", "34.87.36.58"]); CommonSecurityLog | where TimeGenerated between (datetime(2026-11-09) .. datetime(2026-11-18)) | where DestinationIP in (optimjack_ips) | summarize Connections=count(), FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated), Ports=make_set(DestinationPort, 5) by SourceIP, SourceUserName, DestinationIP, DeviceVendor | order by FirstSeen asc Indicators of compromise Block the domains and their subdomains. Report URI’s post is the reference copy and also lists the attacker’s wallet addresses. Type Indicator Context Domain 1688360.cc Main server: track.js, card.php, hit.php, html2canvas.min.js. Suspended November 17 Domain webshell.lol Loader get.js, used in the earlier wave and the first Optimizely injection Domain linkforge.cc SEO panel script that carried the same loader from September Domain 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu iOS router, boot.js Domain eil786npto9u5bq.icu iOS router, Coruna and iOS 26 pages Domain l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo.icu Coruna telemetry, POST /api/iptj Domain je4ft3gn8vxudum.icu, q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu.icu, ios-hack.icu Fallback servers written into boot.js Domain p55abnw2pnsz0bo.icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1.icu, gm38duxoihbmy5o.icu Share certificates and addresses with the exploit kit IP address 136.113.106.136 1688360.cc during the attack IP address 34.96.213.201, 34.87.36.58 The iOS router domains during the attack URL path /track.js, /card.php, /hit.php Payload, card collection, cookie and screenshot collection URL path /boot.js, /A8/, /D11/, /D12/, /C10/, /JIUJIU888/ iOS router and exploit stages Page marker window._k7, window.__k7b Set by the payload in an infected page Page marker data-channel-code="02111110" Attribute on the iOS loader’s script tag Page marker sessionStorage keys starting cc_ Set by the payload in the browser String aHR0cHM6Ly8xNjg4MzYwLmNjL3RyYWNrLmpz The payload URL in base64, as used by the hidden loader SHA-256 f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40 track.js, final build (17:57 UTC) SHA-256 814a963c0da480e2449d9b6664480156e1cd6d731014117401bf635badec3a0f track.js, 17:13 UTC build SHA-256 c2a34c579e4c2e8802752c93b3a9cca0230610f3e4dd6688f4272459c7c7c162 Payload copy embedded in the loader SHA-256 123f813b18cf5a3b513beabd52a110e19f1c7834f2aa9b972633b2214c57e737 webshell.lol/get.js Timeline All times are UTC. September 17, 2026: The actor’s loader on webshell.lol first appears on other websites, carried by a backlink-panel script. November 9, 2026: The first iOS router domain is registered. November 13 to 16, 2026: The loader is injected through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly scripts. November 16, 04:21: First infected Optimizely snippet observed. November 16, 05:23: 1688360.cc is registered. November 16, 08:28: track.js is first seen on a live site. November 16, 13:43: The card skimmer is added. November 16, 17:13 to 17:57: A second iOS exploit host is added. November 16, 19:24 to 19:59: Report URI’s sweep finds 186 of 1,611 snippets infected. The final count is 188. November 16, about 20:40 to 21:10: Infected snippets are cleaned in bulk. November 16, 23:11: Every infected snippet is clean. November 17, 00:37: 1688360.cc is suspended by its registrar. webshell.lol follows at 03:37. November 17, 01:02: Optimizely’s status page confirms the incident and says the vulnerability is fixed and the code removed. November 17, 04:11 to 05:39: The attacker empties the crypto wallets. Frequently Asked Questions We allow only cdn.optimizely.com in our Content Security Policy. Were we protected? Not by that rule. The loader came from that host, so the policy allowed it. What mattered was whether the policy also blocked the script from 1688360.cc, blocked eval, and limited where the page could send data. Does Subresource Integrity help with a snippet like this? Not easily. The Optimizely snippet changes every time someone edits an experiment, so a pinned hash breaks the tests. Integrity checks fit versioned libraries. For a snippet that changes, monitor it for changes and for new hosts it contacts. We self-host the Optimizely snippet. Are we affected? You can be. A self-hosted snippet still carries the contents of your Optimizely project, including Project JavaScript. Does this affect Optimizely Feature Experimentation or the CMS? Optimizely’s notice names Web Experimentation snippet delivery. Nothing published says other Optimizely products served the code. Ask Optimizely to confirm for your account. Were iPhones actually compromised? That has not been shown. The code sent iPhones and iPads to servers hosting the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits, and researchers recorded those servers answering. Nobody has published evidence of a compromised device. Update to iOS 18.7.3 or 26.3 or later. Is blocking 1688360.cc enough? No. One loader carried a full copy of the payload and ran it when the remote script was blocked. The address swapping in that copy works without any network connection. How do we know whether our site served the code? Check the change history of each Optimizely project for November 13 to 17, search Project JavaScript and experiment code for the indicators, and look for archived copies of your snippet from November 16. Optimizely says it has notified affected customers, but check for yourself. How ThreatDefence is responding ThreatDefence has added the indicators from this campaign to our threat intelligence. Across all monitored environments, our SOC is: searching network, proxy and DNS records for the campaign’s domains and addresses identifying users and devices that reached the payload or the iOS exploit servers helping customers that use Optimizely Web review their projects, change history and account access If your site uses Optimizely and you want help working out what it served, or checking whether your users were exposed, contact us. Read more about our managed detection and response. Sources Optimizely, Web Experimentation Security Incident, status page (November 17, 2026) Report URI, World’s Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely (November 16, 2026, updated November 17, 2026) Hudson Rock, Poisoned scripts on BBC, Zoom and other major websites linked to iPhone exploit loaders (November 17, 2026) Optimizely documentation, Custom code, shared code, Project JavaScript and extensions Optimizely documentation, View change history Optimizely documentation, Update your site’s Content Security Policies