Scattered Spider: Who the Group Targets and How to Defend
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Scattered Spider

Scattered Spider is a cybercriminal group that breaks into large organizations by deceiving people.

How Scattered Spider Differs

Its members pose as staff or IT support to obtain passwords and take over multi-factor authentication, then steal data and, in some cases, deploy ransomware.

A joint advisory from the FBI, CISA, the Australian Signals Directorate, the Australian Federal Police, and agencies in Canada and the United Kingdom describes the group. It was first published in November 2023 and updated in July 2025. Because the group attacks people, this profile is organized by who it targets.

Most intrusion groups look for a technical weakness. Scattered Spider looks for a person who can be persuaded. The advisory describes a group that targets large companies and their contracted IT help desks, along with third-party providers whose access reaches many organizations.

The group is also tracked as UNC3944, Octo Tempest, Muddled Libra, Scatter Swine, Oktapus, and Storm-0875.

Once inside, they use the organization’s own tools: legitimate remote access software, cloud administration features, and existing accounts. Little of what they do looks like malware, and organizations with mature security have been compromised for reasons that are structural.

The sign-in is valid

The password is correct and multi-factor authentication is satisfied, so identity systems record a successful, compliant authentication.

The activity looks administrative

Searching documentation, querying the directory, and creating cloud resources are what administrators do.

The human process is the weak point

Help desks are measured on resolving requests quickly and pleasantly, and refusing a senior person who has lost their phone runs against that.

Defending against this group is therefore mostly about identity processes and detection of behavior, and less about blocking files. The questions to ask are who can reset a credential, on what proof, and whether anyone would notice an administrator account enrolling a new device at midnight.

Who Is Behind the Name

Scattered Spider is a label for a loose group of individuals, not a company-like organization with a fixed membership. People join for a job and leave, which is one reason the activity continues after arrests.

What sets them apart from most ransomware crews is language and method. They are fluent English speakers who can pass as an employee on a phone call, and they are comfortable with the internal tools and jargon of large Western companies. Most ransomware affiliates avoid speaking to anyone. This group makes the call.

Law enforcement has pursued alleged members in several countries. In September 2025 the US Department of Justice charged a United Kingdom national in connection with at least 120 attacks, including on critical infrastructure. In July 2026 it announced the arrest in Finland and extradition of another alleged member, in a complaint that describes the group as involved in more than 100 network intrusions and more than USD 100 million in ransom payments.

The joint advisory was updated in July 2025 because the activity had continued and the methods had moved on. The update added help desk impersonation to transfer multi-factor authentication, new tools, the use of DragonForce ransomware, and large-scale data extraction from cloud data platforms. It also records the use of proxy networks and rotating machine names, which blunt checks based on location and device.

The group has worked with several ransomware services over time. The pattern is that they provide the access and the intrusion skill, and use whichever ransomware service is available to apply pressure. For a defender, the ransomware named in a given incident matters less than the way in, which has stayed consistent.

The Help Desk, Step by Step

The help desk is the group’s preferred way in, and the 2025 update to the advisory describes the method. It is worth following in detail, because several steps have a point where it can be stopped.

1
ResearchThe attacker chooses a target employee, usually someone with administrative access or a senior role. From networking sites, public records, and leaked data, they collect the person’s full name, job title, manager, office location, phone number, and often date of birth and address.
2
Reconnaissance callsThe attacker phones the help desk with harmless questions, sometimes more than once. The aim is to learn the procedure: what the agent asks, what counts as proof, and how a reset is carried out.
3
The requestThe attacker calls as the employee. The story is ordinary: a new phone, a lost device, travel, an urgent meeting. They ask for a password reset and for multi-factor authentication to be set up on the new device.
4
VerificationThe agent asks the standard questions. The attacker answers them, because the answers are in public or leaked data. Where the agent hesitates, the attacker applies pressure: seniority, urgency, frustration.
5
The resetThe agent issues a temporary password and removes or replaces the authentication method.
6
EnrollmentWithin minutes the attacker signs in and registers their own authenticator.
7
AccessThe attacker is now the employee, with a fresh password and a second factor they control. Nothing about the sign-in looks unusual to automated checks.

The attack defeats strong authentication without touching it. The employee’s sign-in method was secure. The recovery process around it was not.

Logging and reviewing help desk calls can reveal step two. Step four is the decisive one, and the controls for it are set out under Hardening Identity Recovery below. Step six leaves a trace: a help desk password reset, then a new authentication method registered from an unfamiliar location within minutes, then sign-ins to administration tools.

Employees

The group also approaches staff directly, posing as the IT department by phone or text message.

Requests for codes

The caller says they are fixing an account problem and asks the employee to read out a one-time passcode.

Remote access tools

The employee is directed to install a remote support program so that IT can help.

Push bombing

With the password already in hand, the attacker sends repeated multi-factor prompts until one is approved.

SIM swapping

The attacker persuades a mobile carrier to move the employee’s number to a SIM card they control, and receives codes sent by text.

Phishing pages

Text messages lead to lookalike domains that combine the company’s name with words such as sso, helpdesk, servicedesk, or cms.

The advisory also notes credentials bought from criminal markets, which often come from infostealer malware on an employee’s or contractor’s device.

The defense is phishing-resistant authentication, such as passkeys or security keys, which cannot be read out over the phone or approved by mistake. Add a clear rule that IT never asks for a code, and a simple way for staff to check whether a call from IT is genuine.

Identity and Cloud Administrators

After the first account, the group moves toward the systems that control identity and data. The advisory describes the following activity.

What the group doesWhyWhat to watch
Registers its own multi-factor authentication methodsTo keep access after a password resetNew methods on accounts that were recently reset
Searches SharePoint and internal documentationTo find credential stores, VPN instructions, backups, and virtualization managementUnusual searches and document access by a recently reset account
Enumerates the directoryTo find administrators and paths to themBulk directory queries
Installs remote monitoring and management toolsFor persistent access that looks like IT activityRemote access software that IT did not deploy
Uses cloud management tools and creates cloud virtual machinesTo move through cloud environments and stage toolsNew instances, new access keys, unusual administrative actions
Queries cloud data platforms heavilyTo extract large volumes of data quicklyThousands of queries in a short period from one account
Exfiltrates to cloud storageTo hold data for extortionLarge transfers to external storage services
Encrypts VMware ESXi servers with ransomwareTo add pressureAccess to virtualization management, and virtual machines powered off

The 2025 update describes how the data leaves. Members look for the organization’s access to the Snowflake data platform and run thousands of queries to take large volumes in a short time. Stolen data is moved to MEGA and to Amazon S3 storage. Extortion messages then arrive through Tor sites, the Tox messenger, email, or encrypted messaging applications.

Earlier versions of the advisory described the group adding its own identity provider to a victim’s single sign-on tenant. The advisory now describes that as historical, though new trusted identity sources remain worth checking after any identity compromise.

The Incident Response Team

Scattered Spider watches the response. The advisory states that members have monitored email and chat, including Slack, Microsoft Teams, and Exchange Online, for discussion of their intrusion, and have joined incident response calls.

This lets them see which accounts have been found, adapt before containment lands, and create new identities to replace the ones that are closed. The 2025 update notes new identities backed by fake social media profiles.

Run the response on a channel outside the corporate environment. Verify every participant on every call. Keep the list of people who know the response plan small until the attacker’s access is removed.

Third-Party Providers

The advisory lists third-party service providers among the group’s targets. An outsourced help desk is the most direct case, because the supplier’s staff can reset passwords and change authentication methods for the organization’s people.

Ask which suppliers hold that ability and what verification they use, and hold them to the same procedure as an internal help desk, in writing. The wider checks on a provider’s access are in our LockBit profile.

Tools Named in the Advisory

The group relies on legitimate software. The advisory lists the following, and its 2025 update added several more.

PurposeTools namedNote
Remote monitoring and managementFleetdeck.io, Level.io, Pulseway, Tactical.RMMCommercial and open-source products with many legitimate users.
Remote accessScreenConnect, Splashtop, TeamViewer, AnyDeskLegitimate products, so they often pass application controls.
Tunneling and private networkingNgrok, Tailscale, Teleport.shUsed to reach internal systems from outside.
Credential theftMimikatzExtracts credentials from memory.
Information-stealing malwareRaccoon Stealer, VIDAR StealerCollects credentials, browser history, and cookies.
Remote access malwareAveMaria (WarZone), RattyRATProvides covert access and internal reconnaissance.
RansomwareDragonForceAdded in the 2025 update.
Exfiltration destinationsMEGA and Amazon S3Data staged and moved out for extortion.

Almost every row is a product an IT department might use. Blocking by reputation does little. The effective control is an explicit list of the remote access tools the organization has approved, with everything else blocked or alerted on.

Hardening Identity Recovery

Because the group attacks the recovery process, that process deserves the same design effort as sign-in itself. The aim is that no single phone call can produce a working credential.

Define tiers

Decide which accounts are privileged or high-risk. For these, remove phone-based reset entirely. Recovery requires an in-person check, a video call with identity document verification, or approval from a named senior person.

Call back, never trust the inbound call

End the call and phone the employee on the number held in the HR system. An attacker who controls the inbound number does not control that one.

Require a second person

For sensitive resets, a manager or security team member must approve through a separate channel.

Use what the attacker cannot research

Date of birth, employee number, and manager’s name are all discoverable. A temporary code issued through an existing trusted channel is not.

Delay and notify

Introduce a waiting period before a newly registered method becomes active for privileged accounts, and notify the employee and their manager when any method changes.

Restrict enrollment

Allow new authentication methods to be registered only from a managed device or a trusted location.

Log every reset

Record who requested it, how they were verified, and who performed it. Review resets for privileged accounts daily.

Give help desk staff cover

Make it explicit that refusing a request that fails verification is correct, whoever the caller claims to be, and that escalation is expected.

Watch risky sign-ins

The 2025 update recommends closer monitoring of sign-ins the identity provider flags as risky, since a reset account used from a new network is the first sign the procedure failed.

A useful test is to ask what an attacker with the employee’s public profile, date of birth, and home address could obtain by phoning the help desk. If the answer is a working account, the process needs to change.

If Scattered Spider Is in Your Environment

1
Move the response off normal channelsVerify every participant.
2
Contain the identitiesDisable affected accounts, revoke sessions, and remove authentication methods and devices the user does not recognize.
3
Lock down resetsPause phone-based resets for privileged accounts, and tighten verification for all others.
4
Review identity provider changesNew administrators, new authentication methods, changed policies, and new trusted identity sources.
5
Find and remove remote access toolsSearch the whole fleet, not only the machines known to be affected.
6
Check cloud and data platformsLook for new instances, access keys, and bulk queries.
7
Protect virtualization and backupsThe advisory records the group encrypting VMware ESXi servers.
8
Preserve identity, help desk, and cloud recordsBring in incident responders, the insurer, and legal counsel.

Where the intrusion ends in extortion, the advisory discourages payment.

Scattered Spider Response With ThreatDefence

ThreatDefence hunts for the trace a help desk attack leaves: an administrator password or MFA reset followed by a sign-in from a new device or network. We also monitor Entra ID for federated domains added to a tenant, changes to Conditional Access, and new authentication methods on privileged accounts.

Our SOC disables accounts and revokes sessions under agreed authority, and our responders investigate cloud and identity compromise when the group, or an attacker using its methods, is already inside.

A Microsoft 365 forensic scan in the ThreatDefence portal: six months of activity analyzed, sign-ins by risk, MFA coverage, app consents, findings by severity and the response taken

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    Frequently Asked Questions

    Who is Scattered Spider?

    Scattered Spider is a loose group of English-speaking criminals who break into large organizations by impersonating staff and IT support, then steal data and sometimes deploy ransomware. Agencies in the United States, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom publish a joint advisory on its methods, and US prosecutors have charged alleged members arrested in more than one country.

    How does Scattered Spider get past multi-factor authentication?

    By attacking the process around it. The main method is persuading a help desk to move an employee’s authentication to a device the attacker holds. Others are asking the employee for a one-time code while posing as IT, sending repeated prompts until one is approved, and SIM swapping. Passkeys and security keys resist the code, prompt, and SIM methods, and only a strict recovery procedure stops the help desk route.

    Does Scattered Spider use ransomware?

    In some attacks. The advisory describes data theft for extortion, sometimes followed by encryption of VMware ESXi servers with DragonForce ransomware. The group has used different ransomware services at different times, and some intrusions end in extortion over stolen data with nothing encrypted. A plan that covers only encryption misses those cases.

    What is help desk social engineering?

    It is an attack in which someone phones or messages IT support while posing as an employee, and asks for a password reset or a new authentication device. It works when the help desk verifies callers with facts an outsider can find, such as a date of birth or an employee number. The fix is verification the caller cannot research, such as a callback to a number already on record.

    Why is Scattered Spider hard to detect?

    Each action looks legitimate on its own: a valid sign-in, a help desk reset, an administrator searching documentation. The pattern shows only when events are joined in order, so detection has to connect help desk records with identity logs. Help desk tickets and sign-in logs usually sit in separate systems, and the sequence goes unseen unless someone joins them.

    Does Scattered Spider monitor the incident response?

    Yes. The joint advisory describes members searching internal email and chat for discussion of their intrusion and joining response calls. They use what they learn to set up replacement accounts before the known ones are closed. Confirm each participant’s identity by a method the attacker could not have arranged, and assume any message sent on a corporate channel has been read.

    Has Scattered Spider targeted Australian organizations?

    The Australian Signals Directorate and the Australian Federal Police are co-authors of the joint advisory, and the advisory names no victims in any country. Its methods work against any organization with a help desk and cloud identity, wherever it is based. Australian organizations can test their exposure with one check: whether a caller holding only public information could obtain a password reset.