On this pageWho Gets ImpersonatedReported Losses and TrendsChannels and What They CarryFake Company and Support AccountsExecutive ImpersonationFake Recruiters and Job OffersSupplier Payment Change LuresImpersonation in Paid Search and Social AdsEmail Impersonation TechniquesDetecting and Scoring ImpersonationRecords That Prove a CaseResponding By Case TypeA Fake Recruiter Case at Acme CorpA Plan for the First MonthImpersonation Monitoring With ThreatDefenceFrequently Asked Questions The impersonator poses as the company, its support desk, its leaders, its recruiters or its accounts team, and asks the target for money, credentials or personal data. Almost all of it runs on accounts, domains and ads the organization does not own, so it is found by watching outside channels and stopped through the platforms that host it. This guide covers who gets impersonated, the channels and techniques involved, the evidence each case needs, and how to respond and start a program. Who Gets ImpersonatedAn impersonator borrows whichever identity the target already trusts. For a customer that is usually the company or its support desk, and for an employee it is a manager or the IT team. Each identity opens a different door, so a program lists them separately. The organization itself: A fake company page or account claims to be the official presence and directs people to an offer, a login page or a payment. The support desk: A fake support account answers customers who complain in public and moves them into private messages to collect card details or account access. Executives: A fake profile or message uses a leader’s name and photo to make a payment request, a gift card request or an introduction look authorized. Recruiters and HR: A fake recruiter uses the company’s name and logo to offer jobs that do not exist, then collects fees, bank details or identity documents. Finance and accounts receivable: A message that appears to come from the company tells its customers or suppliers that bank details have changed. The IT help desk: A caller or texter claims to be internal IT support and asks staff for passwords, one-time codes or remote access. Help desk impersonation targets the organization’s own staff. CISA’s advisory on the Scattered Spider group describes actors who posed as company IT and help desk staff, using phone calls and SMS messages to obtain employees’ credentials, and who directed employees to run remote access tools and share one-time passcodes. Reported Losses and TrendsGovernment reporting shows impersonation at large scale across every channel in this guide. The figures come from complaints made to US agencies. Business impersonators: The FTC reported in June 2026 that people reported losing $3.5 billion to imposter scams in 2025, including nearly $1 billion to business impersonators, reached through text, phone, email, social media and search results. Business email compromise: The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) recorded 24,768 business email compromise complaints in 2025, with reported losses of more than $3.04 billion. Employment scams: The same IC3 report lists 24,688 employment scam complaints in 2025 and losses of about $363 million. Social media: In April 2026 the FTC reported $2.1 billion lost to scams that started on social media in 2025, and nearly 30% of people who lost money to a scam said it began there. Generative AI is part of the picture. The IC3 2025 report notes that chat tools can write official-sounding emails that mimic a company’s CEO, that voice cloning can be used to request wire payments, and that businesses reported over $30 million in losses to business email compromise involving AI. Channels and What They CarryEach channel favors a particular kind of impersonation, and each has its own route for reporting it. The digital brand protection guide sets out the wider discipline; this table narrows it to impersonation. Channel Typical impersonation Who it reaches Where it is reported Social media Fake company pages, fake support accounts, fake executive profiles, scam posts Customers, followers, staff The platform’s impersonation report flow Email Display names and lookalike domains posing as executives, finance or the company Staff, suppliers, customers The sending provider’s abuse contact, the registrar of a lookalike domain Job boards and messaging apps Fake recruiters, fake offer letters, task scams Job seekers The job board, the messaging app, the IC3 or national fraud reporting service Search and social ads Ads bidding on the brand, fake support numbers, fake download pages Customers searching for the company The ad platform’s advertiser policy report Phone and SMS Calls and texts posing as IT, a bank contact or an executive, sometimes with a cloned voice Staff, customers The carrier, the national cyber or fraud agency The UK NCSC makes the same point in its brand impersonation guidance: it can happen in online adverts, social media, email, SMS or phone calls. One campaign often uses several channels at once, with an ad or a post driving people to a message thread or a phone number. Fake Company and Support AccountsA fake company account copies the real one’s name, logo and recent posts, and adds one thing the real account would never do. It might promote a giveaway that needs a card number, ask followers to “verify” an account through a link, or post a support phone number that rings the impersonator. Fake support accounts work differently. They watch for customers who complain about the company in public, reply within minutes with a name close to the official handle, and move the conversation to direct messages where they ask for account details. Platforms separate impersonation from commentary, and that decides what can be removed. Official presence: Meta’s Business Help Center says it removes accounts that falsely claim to represent a business’s official presence on Facebook and Instagram. Fan and opinion accounts: The same page notes that fan Pages and opinion accounts generally do not breach its Community Standards, so a critical or unofficial account may stay up. Business reports: Instagram’s Help Center lets users report an account that is pretending to be a business or organization, through the account’s Report option and the choice “It’s pretending to be someone else”. Reports without an account: Meta provides a contact route for people who are being impersonated but have no Facebook or Instagram account of their own. Executive ImpersonationExecutive impersonation turns a leader’s authority into a payment instruction. The classic version is an email or text from “the CEO” asking someone in finance or an executive assistant to make an urgent, confidential payment or to buy gift cards. Newer versions add a profile and a voice. A fake LinkedIn or messaging profile with the executive’s photo contacts staff, partners or investors, and the conversation may move to a call. In December 2024 the FBI warned that criminals use generative AI to produce videos for real-time video chats with alleged company executives, and in May 2025 it reported a campaign using AI-generated voice messages that impersonated senior US officials. LinkedIn’s Help Center lists signs of a fake profile that apply directly to executives. Thin history: The profile has little information, few connections or an unrealistic career timeline. Unusual photos: The picture is a stock image, a celebrity photo or heavily edited. Pressure to move: The account asks for money or sensitive information, or quickly moves the conversation to another platform. Unverifiable claims: It claims to be a company executive without connections that confirm it, or duplicates someone the reader already knows. On LinkedIn, the report flow on the profile includes the option “This person is impersonating someone”. A company can also request verification for its LinkedIn Page by proving ownership of its website, and LinkedIn says a verified Page lets its employees verify their workplace, which gives staff a visible signal that impostors lack. Fake Recruiters and Job OffersRecruitment fraud uses the company’s name to deceive people who are not yet its customers or staff. The FBI has warned since at least January 2020 that criminals spoof company websites and post fake job openings on job boards, and its February 2022 announcement described fake listings that use real company logos, contact details and sometimes the names of real employees. A “recruiter” sends a message, runs a quick remote interview and sends an offer letter on the company’s letterhead. The FTC describes what follows in an August 2023 alert about fake recruiters on LinkedIn and job sites: an invoice for equipment the new hire must pay for with cash, Zelle or PayPal, or a request for a driver’s license, Social Security number and bank account details for “paperwork”. A newer variant is the task scam: the FBI warned in June 2024 of fake work-from-home jobs offered by people posing as staffing or recruiting agencies, where victims are told to pay their “employer” in cryptocurrency. The FBI’s 2022 announcement also lists what employers can do. Search for fakes: Regularly search for fraudulent postings under the company name and report them to the site administrator and to IC3. Lock down posting accounts: Use the job platform’s security features, limit who can post, avoid shared logins, and turn on multi-factor authentication and change notifications. Publish real openings: Post every genuine job on the official website with clear application instructions. Warn applicants: State on the careers page how real recruiting works, for example that the company will never hire through text message, social media or email alone. Supplier Payment Change LuresA payment change lure impersonates the organization to the people who pay it, or to the people it pays. The message says that the company’s bank details have changed, attaches an invoice that looks genuine, and asks that the next payment go to a new account. The Australian Cyber Security Centre’s guidance on business email compromise describes a related form it calls company impersonation. Actors register a domain very close to a known organization’s name, email a vendor asking for a quote on expensive goods, and have the goods delivered before payment while the invoice goes to the real organization. The ACSC lists the warning signs staff and suppliers should know. Changed bank details: A message includes an unexpected change of bank details. Urgency: The request presses for immediate payment or threatens consequences. Unusual authority: A person in a senior position makes a payment request they would not normally make. Near-miss address: The sending domain does not exactly match the supplier’s company name. The defense on both sides is the same verification habit: a change of payment details is confirmed by calling a number already on file, never one given in the message. When the lure comes from a genuine mailbox that was taken over, it becomes a business email compromise investigation inside the organization or the supplier. Impersonation in Paid Search and Social AdsAds let an impersonator appear above the real company in search results or in a target’s feed. Common forms are ads that bid on the brand name and lead to a copied login page, ads offering a “support line” that connects to a scammer, and ads for a fake download of the company’s software. The FTC’s April 2026 data on social media scams found that more than 40% of people who lost money to a scam on social media had ordered something they saw in a social media ad, and that some of those ads led to sites impersonating well-known brands. In September 2026 the FTC sought public comment on whether its Impersonation Rule should be updated to address the ad-optimization tools that platforms provide, including possible measures such as vetting advertisers and removing confirmed scam ads. Ads are short-lived, so evidence matters more here than anywhere else. Capture the ad itself: Record the ad text, the advertiser name shown, the search term or placement that triggered it, and the time. Capture the destination: Save the landing page, its full URL and any phone number it shows. Report through the advertiser policy: Ad platforms have their own forms for impersonation and trademark misuse, separate from ordinary content reports. Email Impersonation TechniquesEmail impersonation takes several forms, and each one is caught by a different control. Microsoft’s documentation separates spoofing, where the sender forges the exact address, from impersonation, where the sender uses a similar user or domain name. Technique What the recipient sees Control that helps Exact domain spoofing The real address, acmecorp.com, in the From line SPF, DKIM and a DMARC policy of quarantine or reject on the real domain Lookalike domain acmecorp-billing.com or acrnecorp.com Domain impersonation protection and monitoring for new registrations Display name only “Jane Smith, CEO” from a free webmail address User impersonation protection and first contact safety tips Compromised genuine account A real supplier or colleague’s mailbox Sign-in and mailbox monitoring, payment verification by phone DMARC only protects the exact domain. Microsoft notes that impersonation can pass SPF, DKIM and DMARC checks when the attacker has registered a lookalike domain and published valid DNS records, which is why lookalike domains need their own watch. Our guide to lookalike domain monitoring covers how those domains are found. For Microsoft 365, user impersonation protection in Defender for Office 365 can cover up to 350 named senders in each anti-phishing policy, and domain impersonation protection up to 50 custom domains. Microsoft states that no senders are protected by default, so executives, finance staff and key suppliers have to be added by an administrator. Detecting and Scoring ImpersonationDetection starts with a written list of what is genuine. Without one, an analyst cannot tell an impostor from an account a regional office opened last year. Official accounts: Every company page, support handle and recruiting account on each platform, with the owner of each. Protected people: Executives, board members, recruiters and finance leads whose names and photos are likely to be used. Brand terms: Company and product names, common misspellings and the phrases used in job titles. Inbound reports: A single mailbox or form where staff, customers and applicants report suspicious contact. Watching then covers social platforms for new accounts and posts that use those names, job boards and messaging channels for postings under the company name, search results and ads for the brand terms, and mail logs for impersonation detections. Many of the best leads come from people who were contacted, so the report mailbox is a monitoring source in its own right. Each finding is then scored before anyone acts. Active or dormant: An account that is posting or messaging comes before one that only exists. What it asks for: A request for payment, credentials or identity documents raises priority above simple misuse of a logo. Who it targets: Customers, applicants, suppliers and staff each need a different warning. Age and reach: A new account with paid ads or many followers spreads faster than an old account nobody sees. Records That Prove a CasePlatforms and registrars act on evidence, and an impersonation case is often lost because the account was renamed or deleted before anyone saved it. Records are captured as soon as a finding is confirmed. Record What it proves How to capture it Profile or page capture The name, photo, handle and claims the account makes A dated screenshot plus the profile URL and any numeric account ID Messages sent to targets What the impersonator asked for and how Screenshots or exports from the person contacted, with time and platform Email headers The real sending domain, mail servers and authentication results The full message source from the recipient’s mail client or the mail platform Impersonation detections Which messages were flagged as impersonating a protected user or domain Microsoft’s impersonation insight in the Defender portal Ad and landing page The ad text, advertiser name, destination URL and phone number A capture taken when the ad appears, with the search term or placement Job posting The listing, the contact address and the recruiter profile The job board URL and a screenshot, plus applicant reports Payment change request The invoice, the new account details and the sender The accounts payable inbox and the supplier’s confirmation by phone Domain and hosting data Who registered a lookalike, when, and where it is hosted WHOIS or RDAP records, DNS records and the hosting provider The NCSC’s brand impersonation guidance notes that a screenshot of the false page may be needed to have it removed. Keeping every record with a time and source also helps if the case goes to the police, the IC3 or a regulator. Responding By Case TypeA response protects the people being targeted first and removes the impersonation second. Removal can take time, and the people already contacted may act in the meantime. Preserve the evidence. Capture the records above before reporting anything, because a report can prompt the account to vanish. Warn the targets. Tell the affected group how to verify genuine contact and where to report, through official channels they already know. Block what can be blocked. Add lookalike domains, sending addresses and phone numbers to mail and web filters, and add impersonated executives to impersonation protection. Report to the host. Use the platform’s impersonation flow, the job board’s fraud report, the ad platform’s advertiser policy or the registrar’s abuse contact. Report to authorities. Where money or data was lost, report to the IC3 in the US, ASD’s ACSC in Australia or the national reporting service elsewhere. Watch for a return. Impersonators often reappear under a new handle or domain, so the case stays open until the same pattern stops recurring. The first actions differ by case type. Case First action Report to Fake support account Post the official support handles and warn customers who interacted The social platform’s impersonation report Fake executive profile Alert staff and partners the profile contacted The platform, filed by the executive or an authorized representative Fake recruiter or job offer Publish a careers page warning and contact applicants who reported it The job board, the messaging app and the IC3 or national fraud service Payment change lure Tell suppliers and customers to confirm bank details by phone The registrar or mail provider, the bank, and police if money moved Impersonating ad Capture the ad and landing page, warn customers on official channels The ad platform’s advertiser policy, the registrar and host of the landing page In the United States, the FTC’s Impersonation of Government and Businesses Rule took effect on April 1, 2024 and lets the FTC go to federal court to seek refunds for consumers and civil penalties against impersonators. A Fake Recruiter Case at Acme CorpAcme Corp is a mid-sized company with offices in the US and Australia, trading on acmecorp.com and acme.com.au. Its case shows how one impersonation finding grows into several. First report. An applicant emails Acme’s HR team to ask why the “onboarding coordinator” wants $1,400 for a laptop. The offer letter carries Acme’s logo and came from acmecorp-careers.com. Confirmation. The security lead checks the list of official recruiting accounts and domains. Neither the domain nor the coordinator’s name appears, and the domain was registered nine days earlier with mail records and no website. Wider search. A search of job boards finds three listings under Acme’s name that HR did not post, each linking to the same contact address. A LinkedIn profile claiming to be Acme’s head of talent, using a stock photo, has messaged dozens of people. Evidence. The team saves the listings, the profile, the applicant’s messages and the offer letter, and records the domain’s registration, DNS and hosting data. Protection. HR adds a warning to the careers page stating that Acme never charges applicants and never hires by text or messaging app alone. The mail team blocks the lookalike domain, and IT adds the head of talent to impersonation protection. Reports. The listings go to the job boards, the profile to LinkedIn through its impersonation option, the domain to its registrar and host, and the case to the IC3. A second thread. While reviewing mail logs, the team finds two messages from the same domain to Acme suppliers, announcing new bank details. Accounts payable calls both suppliers on numbers already on file, and neither has paid. Close and watch. The listings and profile come down and the domain stops resolving. Acme keeps the case open and adds the registrant’s patterns to its watch list, and a month later a near-identical domain is caught on the day it is registered. The applicant’s email started the case, and the search that followed found the supplier lure before any money moved. A Plan for the First MonthA month gives a team time to fix the list of what is genuine, close the most obvious gaps and put a reporting route in place. The work divides by team, and the security lead keeps the list. Security: List every official account, recruiting channel, domain and support number with an owner for each, name the executives and staff to protect, and open the report mailbox. Communications: Publish the official accounts and contact numbers on a security page, which the ACSC notes many organizations also use to list active scams that carry their branding, and request verification of the company’s LinkedIn Page where it is offered. Mail administrators: Check that every owned domain publishes SPF and a DMARC policy, turn on first contact safety tips, and add protected people and domains to impersonation protection. Finance: Write down the payment change verification rule and send it to the suppliers who are paid most often. HR and recruiting: Add the careers page warning and limit who can post jobs under the company name. The month ends with a first search of social platforms, job boards and ads for the brand terms, which becomes the baseline for later findings. After that, one habit keeps the program working: staff, customers, applicants and suppliers all know where to send suspicious contact, and every report gets a reply. Impersonation Monitoring With ThreatDefenceFor executives and staff, the ThreatDefence Brand monitor agent searches social media for profiles built on a person’s name, photo or job title. The customer decides who is covered and updates the list when roles change. Recruiting fraud under the company name and payment change messages sent to suppliers are covered by the same watch. Company and support accounts: Accounts posing as the company or its help desk are picked up, including the ones that answer customers’ public posts. Search and ads: Paid ads on the brand name, fake download and support pages, and false phone numbers in results are raised. Review: A SOC analyst checks a significant case before the customer is told, and resolves the cases the agents cannot settle. Removal: Nothing is reported to a platform until the customer’s named approver agrees, and the Takedown agent stays with each request until the profile, post or ad is gone. The agents work on an AI SOC platform with analysts on shift 24x7, as the brand monitoring page sets out. Frequently Asked QuestionsWhat is executive impersonation?Executive impersonation is the use of a leader’s name, photo or voice to deceive staff, partners, suppliers or investors. It appears as fake social media profiles, emails from lookalike domains or webmail accounts, text messages, and calls that may use a cloned voice. The usual aim is an urgent payment, gift cards, sensitive data or an introduction that the target would refuse from a stranger.Can a company report a fake account that uses its name?Yes. Major platforms accept reports of accounts that pretend to be a business. Instagram’s report flow includes impersonation of a business or organization, Meta offers a route for those without an account, and LinkedIn’s profile report includes an impersonation option. Reports work best when they include the account URL, dated screenshots and a link to the company’s genuine account.Will a platform remove a fan or parody account?No. In most cases a fan or parody account stays up. Meta says it removes accounts that falsely claim to represent a business’s official presence, while fan Pages and opinion accounts generally do not breach its Community Standards. An account becomes a strong removal case when it presents itself as the company and asks people for money, credentials or personal data, rather than discussing the brand.Which email controls help against executive impersonation?DMARC enforcement on the organization’s own domain stops others sending mail as that exact domain, which is worth having. It does nothing about a lookalike domain with its own valid records, or a free webmail account that uses an executive’s name as the display name. Those need impersonation protection in the mail platform, lookalike domain monitoring and a payment verification habit.How do fake recruiter scams use a company's name?Fake recruiters post jobs under a real company’s name, message candidates on job sites and messaging apps, and send offer letters with the company’s logo. They then ask for money for equipment or training, or collect identity and bank details for fake paperwork. The FBI advises employers to search for fraudulent postings under their name and report them.Are AI voice and video clones used to impersonate executives?Yes. A December 2024 FBI warning described generative AI being used to create videos for live chats with supposed company executives, and in 2025 it reported AI-generated voice messages impersonating senior officials. Its 2025 IC3 report records over $30 million in business email compromise losses involving AI. A call-back to a known number defeats a cloned voice.How can staff check whether a request really comes from an executive?Staff should confirm through a separate channel they already trust, such as a phone number in the company directory or a message to the executive’s known account. A request that demands secrecy, urgency or a new payment method is a reason to check, never a reason to skip the check. Written approval rules for payments make the check routine.Who should own impersonation response inside an organization?Security usually leads, because cases need evidence, blocking and links to any account compromise. HR handles fake job offers and applicant contact, finance handles payment lures and supplier calls, communications handles public warnings, and legal supports trademark claims. A named owner for each official account and a single report mailbox keep cases from stalling between teams.Should an organization report impersonation to authorities?Yes, where money or data was lost or a campaign targets the public. In the United States reports go to the FBI’s IC3 and the FTC, in Australia to ASD’s Australian Cyber Security Centre, and in the UK to Report Fraud, or through the government’s cyber incident reporting service for a cyber incident. Reports build the record that enforcement relies on, and the FBI asks employers to report fake job postings to IC3.