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An incident response playbook is a documented procedure for handling one type of security incident. It tells the team what to check, what to do, who decides, and when the incident is over.The clearest way to understand a playbook is to read one. This guide presents a complete playbook for a compromised user account, explains why each part is there, and shows what changes for other incident types.
In the first minutes of an incident, the person on duty has to answer several questions at once. Is this real? How serious is it? What do I do first? Who do I tell? What must I avoid touching? Each answer is simple for someone who has handled the situation before, and hard for someone who has not.
A playbook exists to transfer that experience. It captures what a skilled responder would do, in the order they would do it, so that a less experienced person on a night shift produces the same result.
Stress narrows thinking. People under pressure skip steps they would never skip on a calm day. They reset a password and forget to revoke the session. They close the incident without checking whether other accounts were hit. A written sequence prevents this.
Incidents are rare for any one person. A security analyst may handle a compromised account every week. An IT generalist at a mid-sized company may see one a year. Without a playbook, each one is handled from memory and guesswork.
Order matters. Many response actions are only effective in sequence, and some destroy evidence if done first. Shutting down a server before capturing its memory loses what was running. Notifying the user by email when their mailbox is compromised tells the attacker.
Playbooks also make response measurable. When every incident of a type follows the same steps, it becomes possible to say how long each step takes, where delays occur, and whether a change improved things.
They are not a substitute for judgment. A playbook covers the expected path and tells the responder when to stop and escalate. The best ones say plainly where the script ends: If any of the following are found, raise the severity and call the incident lead.
If any of the following are found, raise the severity and call the incident lead.
This fits on a page. A responder who has never seen this incident type can follow it, and a manager can see at a glance where their decisions come in.
The trigger lists the specific signals that start the playbook, so the person on duty does not have to judge whether this is the right procedure.
The severity part gives a default and the conditions that raise it. Without them, every incident is argued from scratch.
The first actions are numbered because the sequence does the work. Blocking sign-in comes first where the attacker is active or the account is privileged. The password is reset before sessions are revoked, so the attacker cannot sign in again with the password once the sessions are gone. Whatever the attacker added is removed next, and the sign-in logs then confirm that nothing from the attacker’s sources succeeds.
The evidence part says what to collect and where it comes from. Each setting is recorded before it is removed, because deleting an inbox rule without noting it destroys the evidence of what the attacker wanted.
The questions define what the investigation must establish. An incident is not finished when the account is secure. It is finished when these have answers.
Each further action is paired with the role that can approve it. The wider the business impact, the more senior the approver.
The decision points list the choices that belong to people outside the technical team, so they are raised at the right time and not discovered later.
The communication part names who is told, in order of urgency. Without it, the user’s manager, finance, and the privacy lead hear at different times and from different people.
The exit criteria state what must be true before the incident is closed. Most repeat compromises trace back to a closure made without checking.
A playbook stays short by pointing to runbooks for detail. Seeing one step expanded shows where the line falls.
The playbook above says, in the first 15 minutes: Revoke the account’s sessions. That is the right level for a playbook. It states the action and leaves the method to the tool.
Revoke the account’s sessions.
The runbook behind it would cover the following, for the organization’s own identity platform.
The exact console, menu, and button, or the command, with a note on which administrator role is needed.
Invalidates refresh tokens and browser sessions for that user, so they must sign in again on every device.
Access tokens already issued can remain valid for up to about an hour for some services. Revocation also does nothing about a password the attacker still holds, which is why the reset comes first.
The audit log entry to look for, and a check that the user’s next sign-in required authentication.
They will be signed out of mail and applications on phone and laptop, and should be warned through a channel other than their own email.
Nothing to undo. The user signs in again.
The incident lead, with the time it was done.
A responder in a hurry reads the playbook line. A responder who has never done the task opens the runbook. The incident response plan sits above both.
Keeping the documents apart means a tool change does not require rewriting every playbook.
Real incidents do not follow a straight line, and a playbook that pretends they do is abandoned at the first surprise. Good playbooks include a small number of explicit branches.
Take the compromised account playbook. After the first actions, the responder reviews what the session did. What they find changes the path.
Stop treating it as a single-account incident. Assume tenant-wide settings may have been changed, and bring in the incident lead.
Start the payment fraud playbook in parallel. Finance must call the bank now.
Involve the privacy lead. A breach assessment is needed.
This is a campaign. Repeat the first actions for each, and look for the phishing message.
This is a network intrusion. Escalate to the major incident process.
Continue to exit criteria.
Each branch is one line, and each either hands off to another playbook or raises the level. This keeps a single playbook from trying to cover every possibility.
Stop points work the same way. A playbook should name the conditions under which the responder must pause and get a decision, such as before disabling an executive’s account, before contacting a customer, or before wiping a device that may hold evidence.
Every playbook keeps the same parts. The content changes with the incident.
Full detail for the first two is in the guides to ransomware and business email compromise. The notification decision in the data theft playbook is worked through in the data breach response plan guide.
A short playbook shows that the same parts scale down. This one is used far more often than a ransomware playbook and is frequently handled inconsistently. Whether the loss is a notifiable breach is assessed with the test in the data breach response plan guide.
An employee reports a laptop lost or stolen, or a device has been unaccounted for after travel.
Low if the disk is encrypted and the device was locked. Medium if encryption cannot be confirmed. High if the device belongs to an administrator or holds regulated data without encryption.
Record when and where the device was last seen. Confirm encryption status from the device management system. Mark the device as lost and issue a remote wipe. Reset the user’s password, then revoke the device’s sessions and its access to mail and files.
The device management record showing encryption and last check-in. The user’s account of what was on the device and whether it was locked. A police report number if stolen.
Was the disk encrypted? Was the user signed in? What data was stored locally? Has the device connected to anything since?
The security analyst may block the user’s sign-in until the password reset is confirmed. The incident lead may remove the device from the directory so that it cannot rejoin.
If encryption cannot be shown, the privacy lead assesses whether the loss is a data breach.
The user’s manager. The privacy lead where data may be exposed. The insurer if a claim is likely.
Device access revoked, wipe issued, credentials reset, encryption evidence recorded, and breach assessment completed where needed.
The whole playbook takes a few minutes to run. Its value is in the evidence step. An organization that can show a dated record of encryption has a simple answer to the breach question. One that cannot may have to assume the worst.
Playbooks are read at 2 a.m. by someone under pressure. The wording decides whether they are followed.
Revoke the account’s sessions, in place of Session revocation should be considered.
Revoke the account’s sessions,
Session revocation should be considered.
A step that contains “and then” is two steps.
The incident lead approves tells people who to call. “Approval is required” does not.
The incident lead approves
Name the system, the log, or the console.
If the account is privileged, block sign-in is clearer than leaving it to judgment.
If the account is privileged, block sign-in
A short note on why a step comes first helps people adapt when reality differs.
Compare the same instruction written both ways. A weak step reads: Consideration should be given to preserving relevant evidence prior to remediation. A strong one reads: Export the account’s sign-in records for the past 30 days and attach them to the incident log.
Consideration should be given to preserving relevant evidence prior to remediation.
Export the account’s sign-in records for the past 30 days and attach them to the incident log.
Write for the incidents most likely to happen and the ones that would hurt most.
A few playbooks that have been exercised are worth more than a library that has never been opened.
Parts of a playbook can run automatically. Evidence collection is the safest place to start, since it changes nothing. Routine containment that can be reversed, such as revoking sessions, usually follows.
For each automated step, the playbook should state the condition under which it runs, who is told, and how it is undone.
Automate what the team already does the same way every time. A procedure that has never been run by hand should not be handed to automation.
A playbook is a hypothesis about the best way to respond. Incident records show whether it is right.
From the trigger to the first containment step. A long gap means the trigger is unclear or the responder was unsure what to do.
From trigger to the point where the attacker can no longer act.
Where responders departed from the text. Frequent departures mean the playbook does not match reality, and the playbook should change.
How often the playbook handed off to a more serious process, and whether those hand-offs came early enough.
Cases that were closed and came back. These point to weak exit criteria.
Investigations that could not answer one of the playbook’s questions, and which log was missing.
A check on whether effort matches severity.
Review these after each significant incident and across all incidents every quarter. A few numbers, tracked over time, show more than a long report produced once.
The most useful signal is the simplest. If responders with different levels of experience reach the same result using the same playbook, it is working.
ThreatDefence prepares incident-specific runbooks as part of our incident response retainer. Under our 24x7 SOC service, containment follows playbooks that each customer has authorized, such as disabling a compromised Microsoft 365 account.
Each action type has its own setting: recommended for a person to decide, held for approval, or executed automatically. Every action has a documented rollback, so a step taken at 3 a.m. can be reversed in the morning.
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Keep playbooks where responders already work, such as the case management or ticketing system, linked from the alert types that trigger them. Keep a second copy outside the corporate environment, printed or on a separate service, because a ransomware playbook stored only on the file server is unavailable when it is needed. Every copy should show its version, date, and owner.
A playbook describes the response to one incident type from trigger to closure, and says who decides at each point. A runbook gives the exact instructions for a single task in a specific tool, such as revoking sessions in the identity platform. The playbook changes when the organization changes how it responds. The runbook changes when the tool does.
Start with a compromised user account, payment fraud by email, and ransomware. Then add data theft or accidental disclosure, malware on an endpoint, a lost or stolen device, and supplier compromise. Write a new playbook when the same kind of incident has been handled from memory twice. Each one needs an owner and a yearly walkthrough, so keep the set small enough to maintain.
A ransomware playbook opens with the first actions: isolate affected systems and leave them powered on, disconnect backups, restrict administrator accounts, move to a separate channel, and call responders, the insurer, and counsel. It names who decides which systems go offline, the restore priorities, notification, and the response to an extortion demand. Its exit criteria are a closed entry point, reset credentials, validated restored systems, and no attacker activity under monitoring.
A phishing playbook starts when a suspicious email is reported or detected. The first actions are to remove the message from every mailbox it reached, block the sender and any link, and identify who clicked, replied, or opened an attachment. For each person who entered credentials, the compromised account playbook starts. The incident closes when the message is gone and every recipient who interacted has been handled.
Security and IT practitioners should develop the technical procedures with input from the people responsible for business decisions. Legal, privacy, communications, and executive representatives should validate the decisions and notifications relevant to their responsibilities. The people expected to execute the playbook should test it before use.
Yes, in part. Start with evidence collection, because it changes nothing, then add containment that can be reversed, such as revoking sessions. Each automated step needs a stated condition, a notification, and a way to undo it. Decisions with business or legal consequences, such as disabling an executive’s account or contacting a customer, stay with a named person.
Review each playbook at least once a year, after every incident in which it was used, and whenever a system, tool, or supplier it names changes. Check the measures each quarter. Steps skipped or reordered, reopened incidents, and evidence gaps show where the text no longer matches reality. A walkthrough with the people who would use it catches steps that can no longer be carried out as written.
Incident Response Plan
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