ASD Essentials Visibility and Response: Requirements
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ASD Essentials Visibility and Response

ASD Essentials rates asset and risk identification, centralised event logging, detection and incident response together in one enterprise IT capability domain, Visibility and response. ASD describes it as the “procedures and capabilities for detecting, analysing and responding to cyber security events and incidents”.

The domain applies in every priority phase, and its coverage grows as more systems enter scope. ASD’s transition guide says the capability domains “should not be deferred until the technical domains are complete.”

ASD Essentials Visibility and Response Principles

The Visibility and response principles run in the order an incident does. The organisation identifies its assets and security risks, collects and protects event records, detects suspicious activity, decides when an incident has occurred and responds.

ASD’s implementation planning guide names asset registers and detection and response platforms as the main scope, along with incident response plans and procedures. Most detection and response requirements draw on the Detect (DET) and Respond (RES) families of ASD’s Information Security Manual.

IDPrincipleWhat the domain asks for
IDE-01Asset identificationMaintain an approved asset inventory supported by automated discovery of new and changed assets.
IDE-04Security risk identificationAssess relevant weaknesses, attacker techniques and threat behaviours, with continuous review of risk inputs.
PRO-13Identity, credential and access managementRegularly scan codebases, configuration files, file shares and collaboration platforms for exposed keys, secrets and credentials.
DET-01Centralised event loggingEstablish central log storage protected against unauthorised access, modification or deletion.
DET-02Cyber security event detectionDetect unauthorised changes, anomalous authentication and suspicious software execution.
DET-03Cyber security incident identificationTriage alerts promptly against incident thresholds, correlating signals across identities, applications, data and infrastructure.
DET-05Detection capability efficacyReview detection coverage periodically and identify gaps caused by new assets, services or architectural changes.
RES-03Cyber security incident responseUse documented, tested and approved incident response procedures.
RES-04Cyber security incident insightsReview incidents to identify security gaps, reassess monitoring and response procedures, and improve them.
RES-05Cyber security incident coordinationIncorporate required external coordination and reporting obligations into incident response procedures.

Collecting logs, detecting threats and identifying incidents are separate pieces of work, each rated through its own actions. Central storage holds the evidence. Detection logic picks out the activity that needs attention. Triage decides whether that activity meets the organisation’s incident thresholds.

A healthy logging platform does not show that automated detections fire or that incidents are handled within defined timeframes. The rules can sit untested and alerts can wait past the triage target while every log arrives on time.

Logging Actions in the Technical Domains

Some logging and detection actions are assessed inside the individual technical domains, outside Visibility and response.

Log forwarding is one of them. If systems in the User devices domain stop sending their logs, the gap counts against the User devices assessment, even when the central logging platform is working correctly. The platform and the systems that forward to it are assessed through different actions.

ASD Essentials and SIEM covers the logging actions and security log sources across the technical domains.

Evidence to Collect for Visibility and Response

The evidence to collect for Visibility and response has to show logging, detection, triage and incident response operating as intended. An ASD Essentials assessment rates effectiveness, and no rating follows from owning a particular security product.

Under ASD’s indicators, detection that relies entirely on manual review is not effective. That puts automated alerting, defined triage timeframes, working correlation and the records of testing and improvement on the list of things to prove.

The collection methods are common practice rather than ASD requirements.

EvidenceHow to get itWhat it should show
SIEM log source listExport the data connector or log source list from the SIEM and map each source to an in-scope system. In Microsoft Sentinel, use the Data connectors page, or run a KQL query on the Usage table to show which tables received data in the last 24 hours.High-value security logs and configuration changes from all relevant infrastructure, operating systems and applications reach central storage, with sources reviewed at regular intervals (IT.DET-01.2, rated in each technical domain).
Last-event-per-source reportRun a query returning the most recent event time for each source or table. Repeat it at intervals across the assessment period and keep the dated results.Completeness validated against expected sources, every in-scope source reporting within the defined forwarding window, and silent sources investigated (IT.DET-01.2).
Retention and access settingsExport the retention period for each log type or table and the roles with access to the log platform. Keep dated screenshots where exports are unavailable.Retention defined against investigative, regulatory and contractual needs and applied consistently, with access restricted to documented roles and logged (IT.DET-01.3).
Detection rule exportExport analytics or correlation rules with their enabled state, last modified date, source tables and associated change or tuning records.Automated rules alerting on unauthorised configuration changes, anomalous authentication and suspicious process execution, tested and tuned on a defined cycle (IT.DET-02.2).
Triage timesExport incident or case tickets showing alert creation, triage start, severity and escalation timestamps. Calculate time to triage against documented targets.Documented triage with severity thresholds, alerts handled within defined timeframes, performance tracked and reported, and incidents identified using correlated signals (IT.DET-03.1, IT.DET-03.2).
Detection coverage reviewRetrieve the dated coverage review, records of new assets and services assessed, and tickets documenting identified gaps.Reviews completed within the defined cycle, new assets assessed for logging and detection coverage, and gaps remediated within risk-based timeframes (IT.DET-05.1).
IR plan with version and approvalCollect the current incident response plan showing its version, approval date and approver, together with an external reporting annex covering triggers, contacts and timeframes.Approved roles, escalation paths, target timeframes and intended outcomes, plus external coordination requirements for relevant legal, regulatory and contractual parties (IT.RES-03.1, IT.RES-05.1).
Exercise recordsCollect the scenario, attendance, timeline, findings and corrective actions from tabletop or technical exercises held during the period.The plan exercised or invoked within the defined test cycle and, where no relevant incident occurred, exercises showing that target timeframes can be met (IT.RES-03.1).
Post-incident reviewsRetrieve reviews for incidents meeting the defined severity threshold, including linked corrective actions and their current status.Gaps identified at each incident stage, monitoring coverage and procedures re-evaluated, and remediation tracked to closure (IT.RES-04.1, IT.RES-04.2).
Asset discovery resultsExport the latest automated discovery results and records reconciling newly detected assets against the approved inventory.Discovery operating on a defined schedule across all segments, with new or changed assets reconciled to the inventory (IT.IDE-01.1).

System-generated exports and timestamped tickets are generally stronger evidence than screenshots because they show what happened and when. Where a system offers no export, a screenshot will do if the date, the scope and the tenant or system are all visible in it.

A source that appears in a connector list may still be sending nothing. A typical case is a firewall that stays listed as connected long after an expired certificate or a failed agent upgrade stopped its events. Comparing the expected source inventory with last-event timestamps finds these silent systems, along with the partial collection that a configured integration can hide.

For detection, a list of enabled rules is only the starting point. The records need to show that the required event categories raise alerts, that rules were tested and tuned, and that investigations drew on more than one source.

ASD’s assessment process guide asks whether evidence is recent enough to reflect the current implementation. Log health, triage performance, coverage reviews and exercise records need to span the assessment period, because an export from a single day shows only that day.

Keeping these records current between assessments is covered in Essential Eight reporting.

Carry Forward Essential Eight Controls

Essential Eight monitoring and incident response controls carry forward into ASD Essentials Visibility and response, but each one has to be checked for coverage and effectiveness against a broader set of actions.

The Essential Eight spread this work across its strategies. ASD’s transition guide explains that it included logging, monitoring and incident response requirements within individual mitigation strategies.

Centralised logging was already part of the Essential Eight from Maturity Level Two, so some of the groundwork may be in place. Existing investments that may be reused include:

Authentication and access logs

Centralised MFA events, privileged access activity and account management records.

Endpoint and application logs

Application control records, PowerShell activity and command-line logging.

Log protection

Controls preventing unauthorised access, modification or deletion of event records.

Security monitoring

Processes for analysing security-relevant events and investigating findings.

Incident response

Existing escalation, reporting and incident response procedures.

ASD’s transition guidance names the areas where these capabilities may need strengthening: forwarding configuration changes, correlating activity across multiple sources, extending detection logic, reviewing coverage, exercising response procedures and incorporating lessons from incidents.

For example, authentication and endpoint logs that are already collected may support several actions as they stand. The organisation still has to show that its detection logic covers the required behaviour, that alerts are triaged within defined timeframes and that coverage gaps are reviewed.

A control carried over from the Essential Eight remains useful. Its presence alone does not make the corresponding ASD Essentials action fully effective.

Moving from the Essential Eight to ASD Essentials explains how to map existing controls and reuse assessment evidence.

Visibility Across OT and Cloud

Visibility and response is assessed differently across enterprise IT, operational technology and cloud environments. The systems, the available evidence, the operational authority and the consequences of an incident all change from one to the next.

The purpose stays the same in every chapter: detecting security events and supporting an appropriate response. Which actions apply, and which domain holds them, has to be checked chapter by chapter.

Operational Technology

In OT, Visibility and response puts more weight on operational dependencies, isolation planning, incident coordination and recovery.

The OT chapter includes actions addressing:

Asset criticality

Record the criticality and dependencies of operational assets.

Isolation

Identify points where complete isolation can be enacted.

Communications

Set up alternative communications between sites and personnel.

Forensic collection

Collect forensic artefacts within pre-approved areas.

Remote access

Rehearse procedures for rapidly disconnecting remote access.

Recovery

Support recovery without supplier assistance.

The OT Visibility and response matrix contains no DET principles. Detection-related actions appear in the OT technical domains, including continuous traffic capture at OT-connected demilitarised zone boundaries.

The OT chapter also has no DET-03, DET-05 or RES-04 actions.

An enterprise IT evidence checklist does not transfer to OT unchanged. It would ask for triage times, coverage reviews and post-incident reviews, which map to actions the OT chapter does not contain. The organisation needs evidence for the actions actually assigned to the OT domains, particularly its approved isolation points, communication arrangements and response procedures.

Cloud Environments

The cloud chapter keeps the enterprise IT principles for Visibility and response and adapts the detection and response actions to cloud activity and shared responsibilities.

Cloud detection logic includes anomalous control-plane activity such as consent grants, federation changes and privilege elevations. Within the corresponding action, these take the place of the enterprise IT emphasis on suspicious software execution.

Cloud response procedures also address tenant and identity-provider compromise, token and session revocation, unauthorised consent grants and provider notification arrangements.

Responsibility differs between service models:

Supplied

Many cloud detection actions carry this designation. The provider supplies the capability, and the organisation enables, configures, operates and monitors it.

Provider

For SaaS, detection logic and baselining carry this designation. The organisation has no direct operational control here, so it verifies the provider’s capability through assurance evidence.

Cloud assessment evidence follows the responsibility assignment. Where the provider operates the detection logic, the provider’s assurance records may be the appropriate evidence, since the organisation cannot export a configuration it has no access to.

The cloud chapter provides the applicable actions and responsibility assignments.

Visibility and Response With ThreatDefence

ThreatDefence operates a 24x7 SOC with its team based in Australia and a 3 min average response under guaranteed SLAs. Threat hunting and an incident response retainer are included in the standard service.

The platform investigates identity threats, including session token replay, and network threats, including lateral movement, alongside SIEM data on one platform under one licence.

Response actions remain within the authority each customer approves. Case records can be exported for an assessor or at the end of a contract. Australian customers’ data and AI processing remain in Australia.

ThreatDefence does not certify organisations. The assessor determines ASD Essentials ratings.

Before a formal assessment, the free ASD Essentials Navigator lets organisations rate each action for their own environment and see how principles and domains roll up. Readers new to the framework can start with the five-minute ASD Essentials explainer, which walks through principles, actions, domains, priority phases and ratings.

Response actions in the ThreatDefence portal with each action's operating mode, approval status and rollback option

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    Frequently Asked Questions

    Do we need a SIEM to meet the Visibility and response domain?

    No. ASD Essentials names no SIEM or other product category. The actions ask for protected centralised logging, automated detection and the ability to investigate evidence across systems. A SIEM is the common way to provide these, and equivalent tools or services may also support them. The assessment examines whether the actions operate effectively, whatever technology sits behind them.

    Do we need 24x7 monitoring for ASD Essentials?

    No. ASD prescribes no monitoring hours. Its indicators assess whether alerts are triaged within the response timeframes the organisation has defined and escalated when incident thresholds are met. A short response target may still call for 24x7 monitoring through an internal or outsourced SOC, since relevant alerts can arrive outside business hours. The evidence is actual triage performance measured against the documented targets.

    Can an MSP or SOC provider meet this domain for us?

    Yes. An MSP or SOC provider can operate logging, detection, triage, investigation and incident response on an organisation’s behalf. Accountability stays with the organisation, which still has to show that the arrangement is effective. Supplier assurance under GOV-11 makes current provider evidence important. The organisation should be able to obtain the relevant log records, investigation histories, response decisions and evidence of operating performance.

    Which principles belong to the Visibility and response domain?

    The enterprise IT domain includes IDE-01, IDE-04, the secrets scanning action of PRO-13, DET-01, DET-02, DET-03, DET-05, RES-03, RES-04 and RES-05. These cover asset and risk identification, exposed secrets, logging, detection, incident identification, response and improvement. Baselined high-risk access activities under DET-04 sit within the priority phase 1 and 2 technical domains, while log forwarding is rated within each applicable technical domain.

    Is manual log review enough for ASD Essentials?

    No. ASD’s indicators for IT.DET-02.2 rate detection that relies entirely on manual log review, without automated rules or alerting, as not effective. Automated logic covering only some of the required categories is partially effective. The categories are unauthorised configuration changes, anomalous authentication and suspicious software execution. Rules that are deployed but never tested or tuned on the organisation’s defined cycle are also partially effective.

    Does secrets scanning belong to Visibility and response?

    Yes. The PRO-13 action to Identify and remediate unsecured keys, secrets and credentials by regularly scanning codebases, configuration files, file shares and user collaboration platforms is assessed in Visibility and response rather than Identity services. ASD’s indicators expect scanning across those locations on a defined schedule, followed by assessment and rotation or revocation of exposed secrets within defined timeframes. Leaving discovered secrets in place is not effective.

    Where does asset discovery fit in ASD Essentials?

    Asset discovery is assessed within Visibility and response through IT.IDE-01.1. The action asks for an approved asset inventory mechanism that supports automated discovery to detect new and changed physical and non-physical assets. ASD’s indicators rate manually maintained inventories without automated discovery as not effective. Discovery that is reconciled with the inventory only manually or inconsistently is partially effective. Maintaining current asset records under IT.IDE-01.2 is assessed in each technical domain.

    How is Visibility and response different in the OT chapter?

    The OT Visibility and response matrix contains no DET principles. Detection activities, including continuous traffic capture at OT-connected demilitarised zone boundaries, appear within technical domains instead. The OT chapter also has no DET-03, DET-05 or RES-04 actions. Its Visibility and response actions emphasise asset criticality, isolation points, alternative communications, approved forensic collection, remote access disconnection and recovery without supplier assistance. See ASD Essentials for OT.